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Institute for the Study of the USSR

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The BULLETIN is a publication of the INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF THE USSR. Its purpose is to present the free world an analysis of contemporary events and studies of Soviet history and culture by persons who know the system intimately. Most of our writers and analysts have lived in the Soviet Union, some of them very recently, and are accordingly able to analyze life in the USSR from the viewpoint of personal experience.

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bulletin Institute for the Study of the USSR

September 1958

ARTICLES

The Soviet Ruling Class

ABDURAKHMAN AVTORKHANOV

Although the members of the Soviet Communist Party would have us believe that it is a party united in its ideology and with common interests, in fact it can be divided into three clearly defined social categories: (1) the Party bureaucracy (the leading group), (2) the official or departmental bureaucracy (the subsidiary group), and (3) those engaged in physical labor (workers and kolkhozniks). Since the Bolshevik Party called itself the party of the working class, destined to bring about the "dictatorship of the proletariat," Lenin attached particular significance to the absolute predominance of rank-and-file workers in the Communist Party. He returned to the problem of the social composition of the Party and the need to open wide the doors to persons at the bottom of the social ladder and to the very dregs of society many times, both before the Revolution and particularly after the Bolshevik seizure of power.[1]

At the Eighth All-Russian Conference of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in 1919, new statutes were adopted, under which workers and peasants had to undergo a two months' probationary period, all others a six months'.[2] At the Tenth Congress in 1921, the period was increased to one year for non-workers, including peasants, and a resolution was carried on the first Party purge.[3] A year later, at the Eleventh Party Congress in 1922, still more radical resolutions were passed to prevent salaried employees and, in some cases, peasants from entering the Party and to make the selection even of workers more careful.[4]

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Works), 4th ed., Moscow, 1950, VI, 456–59; 1947, IX, 214–15; 1947, X, 19; 1950, XXX, 164; 1950, XXXI, 29.

[2] *KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh sezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK* (The Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences, and Plenums of the Central Committee), 7th ed., Moscow, 1953, Part I, p. 462.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 520–21.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 623–24.

The Thirteenth Party Conference in January, 1924 passed a resolution calling for admission into the Party of at least 100,000 workers "from the lathe," with a simultaneous suspension of admittance of "nonproletarian elements."[5] After Lenin's death this measure was put into effect and brought about a rapid increase in Party membership, from 446,080 in 1924 to 741,147 in 1925. Finally, the Thirteenth Party Congress in May, 1924 decreed that not less than 50% of the Party members be workers "from the lathe."

This decree, however, was never really carried out in practice, as can be seen from the following table, which gives a breakdown of the three categories of Party members from 1905 through 1932:

Social Breakdown of the Soviet Communist Party, 1905–32

	Total Members and Candidate Members	Workers	Peasants	Salaried Employees
		(Percentage of Total)		
1905 (January) ...	8,400	61.7	4.7	33.6
1917 (January) ...	23,600	60.2	7.6	32.2
1917 (October) ..	70,000	—	—	—
1921 (March)	732,521	—	—	—
1922	401,000	44.4	26.7	28.9
1924	446,080	44.0	28.8	27.2
1925	741,117	57.9	25.3	16.8
1926	1,002,490	58.1	24.6	17.3
1927	1,131,254	56.1	26.3	17.6
1928	1,220,836	57.8	22.3	19.9
1930	1,572,164	65.8	19.7	11.5
1931	2,066,400	66.6	22.3	11.1
1932	3,172,215	64.5	27.8	7.7

NOTE: The 1930 percentages, which add up to only 97%, are as in the source.
SOURCE: *Malaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya* (The Small Soviet Encyclopedia), Moscow, 1934, II, 523–24.

This table shows the rapid drop in the proportion of workers in the Party and the subsequent rise in the proportion of peasants and salaried employees between the beginning of 1917 and the introduction of special measures at the Thirteenth Party Congress.

It is not chance which led to the omission from the table of the years 1918, 1919, and 1920 and the social origins of the Party members for 1921, but a deliberate distortion, the reason for which becomes clear on examination of the relevant figures from another Soviet source:

Social Breakdown of the Soviet Communist Party, 1917–20

(Percentage of Total)

	Workers	Peasants	Salaried Employees	Others
1917	56.6	16.3	21.6	6.1
1918	40.1	28.0	25.1	6.8
1919	38.2	29.7	24.8	7.3
1920	33.2	36.9	22.1	7.8

SOURCE: *Itogi partiinoi raboty za god 1922–1923* (Results of Party Activity for the Year 1922–23), Moscow, 1923, p. 22.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 783.

Thus, there was a steady decline in proletarian representation, reaching as low as 33.2% in 1920.

It is obvious that the policy adopted by the Party bosses (acting through the Party apparatus) has never been dependent on the rank-and-file members. However, the Party's doctrine, "The Communist Party is the vanguard of the proletariat," meant that the predominance of workers in the Party had to be maintained.

Party statistics have given the terms "worker," "peasant," and "salaried employee" a new connotation. Thus, for example, in the Party a "worker" is not only the man operating a lathe etc., but anyone who has worked at some time or other. Hence the need for subdividing workers on the Party lists into "workers" and "workers from the lathe." Taking this further subdivision into consideration, it can be seen that the number of Party members engaged in physical labor was considerably smaller even during the most "proletarian" period. Thus, on January 1, 1924, 18% of the Party members were "from the lathe"; on January 1, 1925, 40.8%; and in June 1927, 36.7%.[6] This last figure shows a decline, in spite of the "Leninist appeal" and two purges of nonworkers (the 1925 purge of higher educational establishments and the 1926 purge of rural Party cells).

The two "general purges" of 1930 and 1933 affected the workers just as much as the nonworkers, due to their great dissatisfaction caused by the inauguration of collectivization, the five-year plan system and the eradication of the last traces of the New Economic Policy. It was not pure chance that the new Party statutes of 1934 did not favor workers to the same extent as they had been favored before, their period of candidacy being raised to one year; engineers and technicians entering the Party were given the same rights as young industrial and agricultural workers and hence had priority over the kolkhozniks.[7] This was something new as far as the regulation of the Party's structure was concerned, for the question of workers' predominance in the Party had ceased to be a "categorical imperative."

The Seventeenth Party Congress took this a step further when it passed a special resolution which in fact predetermined the social make-up of the Party during Stalin's time. The first clause of the resolution stated:

> In order to eliminate the mechanical and indiscriminate method of admitting members to the Party, as has taken place in a number of instances, it has been decided to increase the number of recommendations needed for admission to the Party, to increase the length of Party service required by sponsors, to accept into the Party only activists who have proved themselves in their work in some public organization or other, and to ensure a thorough check of prospective members by demanding credentials from the organization in which they have been employed.[8]

The Party now needed not workers or peasants but "activists" who could stand up to the most thorough police investigation. The further nation-wide check-up of Party documents and the great Yagoda-Yezhov-Beria purges were not conducted from the standpoint of what a man had been but what he might become. As a result of these purges between 1934 and 1939, 1,220,934 Communists

[6] *Bolshevik*, No. 21-22, 1926; *Pravda*, July 14 and November 2, 1927.

[7] *KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh sezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK*, *op. cit.*, Part II, p. 778.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 769.

were expelled from the Party,[9] almost half the total membership at the time (2,809,786). The places of those expelled were filled with persons who met the new requirements, and by the Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939 membership had again risen to a total of 2,476,966 members and candidate members.

The Party's new requirements thus no longer had anything to do with origin, profession, or occupation. The Party leadership was not interested in the social status of members, but in their ability, providing they were unquestioning in their devotion to the Party apparatus. These new requirements and the Party's new social character were given a legal formulation in the new 1939 Party statutes. The Eighteenth Party Congress did away with the last vestiges of the preferential treatment formerly shown workers and laid down a standard form of procedure for workers, peasants, and intellectuals, who were all to pass through a one-year period of candidate membership.[10]

At the beginning of the 1930's, it was evident that the Party had been split into groups not according to social origin, but according to position, and that material, practical, and even legal interests had been taken into consideration. Political interests were now left entirely to the Party apparatus. It is significant that this division into groups found expression in the Party vocabulary with the introduction of the word *aktiv*–"Party *aktiv*," "government *aktiv*," "trade union *aktiv*," and so on, showing that the Party was divided into groups, the "activists," who directed Party and government affairs, and the "passivists," who made up the vast majority. However, a more significant division was the one under which even the activist groups did not enjoy equal rights, but functioned on a hierarchical system. Under this system the *apparatchiki* (members of the Party apparatus) constitute the high command, while all the other members are leaders only within the limits of their own particular sphere. As such, they are subordinate, differential groups in their relationship towards the ruling, integral group of Party *apparatchiki*.

In 1937, Stalin openly stated that the Party now had a hierarchical structure on military lines. He even used military terminology, dividing the Party into three corps: "the Party generals" (3,000–4,000), "the officer corps" (30,000–40,000), and "the noncommissioned officer corps" (100,000–150,000).[11] The remaining 2,000,000 Communists were, according to Stalin's system, merely the obedient rank and file. Two years later the Eighteenth Party Congress legally confirmed the first two corps' rights and privileges within the Party.[12]

To facilitate the process by which young Communists could take the place of the old Bolsheviks who had been purged from the "generals" and the "officer corps," the Congress shortened the length of Party service necessary for the post of secretary of oblast and krai committees and the central committees of national Communist parties to five years (as opposed to twelve) and for the post of secretary of city and raion committees to three years (as opposed to ten and seven respectively).[13]

[9] *Vestnik*, Munich, No. 1 (1956), pp. 7 and 11.

[10] *KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh sezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK, op. cit.*, Part II, pp. 917 and 919.

[11] *Pravda*, March 29, 1937.

[12] *KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh sezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK, op. cit.*, Part II, p. 919.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 921.

The war brought about many changes in the Party, especially quantitatively; it did not, however, alter the hierarchical nature of its structure. The postwar period accelerated and gave the final shape to the Party's social, professional, and functional character.

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The structural changes which took place in the Soviet Communist Party had their origin in the social changes which had occurred. The official Soviet figures for these social shifts are as follows:

Changes in the Social Make-up of Pre- and Post-Revolutionary Russia, 1897–1955

(Percentage of Total)

Classes and Social Groups (Including Families)	1897	1913	1928	1955
Working Class	14.3	14.8	14.6	44.2
Agricultural Workers	2.5	3.5	2.0	7.4
Peasants	68.5	66.7	77.8	41.7
Individual Peasants	—	—	74.9	0.5
Kolkhoz Peasants	—	—	2.9	41.2
Bourgeoisie	15.2	16.3	4.6	—
Rural Bourgeoisie (Kulaks)	11.0	11.4	4.2	—
Intelligentsia	2.0	2.2	3.0	14.1

NOTE: The population for the years concerned was: 1897, 125,600,000; 1913, 139,300,000; 1928, 152,300,000; and 1955, 200,200,000.

SOURCE: V. S. Nemchinov, *Vsemirno-istoricheskoe znachenie Velikoi Oktyabrskoi revolyutsii* (The World-wide Historical Significance of the Great October Revolution), Moscow, 1957, p. 65.

Thus, the main classes in the country are the working class (44.2%), the kolkhoz peasantry (41.2%), and the intelligentsia (14.1%).

As before the Revolution the working class still engages in physical labor and its source of income is still wages. All that has happened is that it has grown in size, now works for the state, and has been deprived of the legal advantages it gained after the 1905 Revolution. However, there have been radical changes in the life of the peasants. Their well-being and the amount they earn no longer depend on their own efforts, but on the state, which is now also the source of their income.

The intelligentsia forms a totally different class by reason of the source and amount of its income, its legal position, and its status in the social structure of Soviet society. To a certain extent it has taken the place of the old Russian gentry in its legal status, and of the bourgeoisie in its economic, although this obviously does not apply to the whole of the Soviet intelligentsia, which itself is not homogeneous, but divided into a ruling stratum (the bureaucracy) and a serving stratum (technicians, teachers, doctors, scientists, and artists). The ruling intelligentsia has taken the place of what Soviet statistics refer to as the pre-Revolutionary bourgeoisie, although the figure of 16.3% given for the "bourgeoisie" in 1913 was inflated by the inclusion of prosperous peasants (11.4%).

A further important social factor was the growth of a bureaucracy of specialists in the various spheres of state, economic, administrative, social, and cultural life. Thus, on January 1, 1956, the USSR had 5,553,000 specialists with a higher

and secondary specialized education (compared with 190,000 in 1913), of whom 33.8% were Communists, engaged primarily not in production but in administration.

No less important, particularly as far as the social structure was concerned, was the fact that the state became the source of subsistence for the majority and a source of personal enrichment for the minority. Thus, in 1955, 56.1% of the Soviet working population was made up of wage earners, paid by the state, 32.1%, mainly peasantry, was on the workday-unit system, and only 11.8% worked for themselves.[14] Bearing in mind that the state is not only the employer but also determines the rates of payment for the workday unit, it is evident that the Communist Party, besides having absolute political power, also enjoys a complete monopoly of the country's capital, controlling the distribution of the national income and hence the standard of living of every Soviet citizen. From this it follows that since the state has become the general source of income, a person's standard of living is automatically dependent on his place in the production and state hierarchy.

When applied to Soviet society, the Marxist definition of class as the relationship of people to the means of production loses all meaning. Nevertheless, it is tenaciously upheld by Soviet scholars with the result that juridically Soviet citizens are on an equal footing as far as their relationship to the means of production, whether state or kolkhoz, is concerned.[15] This creates the illusion that there is no exploiting class in the USSR, since none of the means of production are in private hands.

Relationship to the means of production, however, is no criterion of class in the USSR, where the determining factor in this respect is relationship to the organs of administration and distribution. The size of the Soviet citizen's income depends upon the source from which it comes. The income of a worker, kolkhoznik, technician, or Army officer is entirely determined by the group to which he belongs and is paid in the form of wages. The income of the ruling bureaucracy and the standard of living of its members is directly proportional to the position of the person concerned on the social ladder. The source of their income is power, and the extent of this power determines the size of their income. The Party bureaucracy is the ruling class in the Soviet Union and governs the country by means of a highly qualified official or departmental bureaucracy embracing all aspects of Soviet life.

The Party bureaucracy and the various departments are not a "closed shop," though it is much harder to get in than it is to be expelled. The bureaucrat's career depends upon his loyalty to the regime, but nevertheless there is a premium on talent. Furthermore, loyalty to the regime does not mean only fanatical devotion to Communism, but loyalty to the current Party apparatus and readiness to follow the current Party line.

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[14] V. S. Nemchinov, *Vsemirno-istoricheskoe znachenie Velikoi Oktyabrskoi revolyutsii* (The World-wide Historical Significance of the Great October Revolution), Moscow, 1957, p. 69.

[15] *Spravochnik partrabotnika* (The Party Worker's Handbook), Moscow, 1957, p. 65.

Up to the beginning of the 1930's it was impossible for any Party or government official of whatever rank to receive a salary of more than the so-called "Party maximum," which was fixed at 198 to 250 rubles a month, according to the region concerned. But from the middle of the 1930's the Party *aktiv* was divided into four groups, on the pattern of the country's administrative system: (1) workers on the raion committee level, (2) workers on the oblast committee level, (3) workers on the union republic central committee level, and (4) workers in the Party Central Committee. The standard of living now depended upon the group to which the individual concerned belonged, but in the case of the last two groups, salary is indirectly augmented by additional privileges of considerable value. The most important are a private house or apartment in town and a private villa in the country, automobiles for official and personal use, a maid, governess, family physician, gardener, hairdresser, and chauffeur, periodical grants from the Central Committee medical committee, free family tickets to health resorts, and virtually unlimited expense accounts.

The standard of living of the other two groups is much more modest and limited, but even so they have never lived on their salary alone. "Payments in kind," obtained in the form of gifts from subordinates or monetary bonuses from their superiors enable them to live quite comfortably.

World War II to a certain extent disrupted the normal process of the Communist Party's development as the party of working bureaucracy, for it again became necessary to broaden its social framework. The armed forces' Party political organs carried on a widespread campaign to step up the recruitment of troops into the Party. To hasten the process the Party Central Committee on September 9, 1941 decreed that for military personnel the period of candidacy be cut to three months, while the process of enrollment was simplified. All this led to the Party's being artificially inflated.[16] Thus, in 1941, there were 3,800,000 members and candidate members; in 1942, 5,149,000; and in 1944, 5,800,000. The figures for the Red Army show an even greater rise: at the end of 1941 it had 1,300,000 Party members, 42.4% of the total Party membership; in 1942, more than 2,000,000; and at the end of the war, 3,500,000, equivalent to 60% of total membership. Moreover, during the first year of the war alone the Party lost 400,000 members killed in action, a good indication of the growth in the number of Party members among the rank and file.[17]

After the war the need for the Party to expand by taking in ordinary Soviet citizens disappeared and, as the Central Committee's spokesman at a meeting of the Cominform in Warsaw in 1947 stated, the Party had decided not to force a further increase in its membership. This followed a decree passed in 1946 reducing the admission of new members to the Party to a minimum.[18] Later, at the Nineteenth Party Congress in 1952, it was stressed that the Party's strength lay not

[16] G. Malenkov, *O deyatelnosti TsK VKP (b): Informatsionnoe soobshchenie nekotorykh kompartii v Varshave* (On the Activities of the Party Central Committee: Communist Party Information Report in Warsaw), Moscow, 1948, p. 144.

[17] *Voprosy istorii*, No. 2 (1958), pp. 40 and 55–56; G. Malenkov, *op. cit.*, pp. 144–45.

[18] G. Malenkov, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

in its numbers but in its quality.[19] In other words, the prewar policy of strengthening the Party by recruitment from the reserve of the working bureaucracy had been reintroduced.

One interesting fact is that in a decree issued by the Party Central Committee on July 26, 1946, the wartime practice of mass recruitment was condemned, which amounted to a condemnation of the policy of the Central Committee itself. The decree stated that "cases had been discovered of violation of the Leninist principle of individual selection of Party members to the detriment of the quality of those enrolled."[20] The decree indicated that only "politically mature, go-ahead" members of the working class were needed in the Party, and that the most important requirement was an increase in the number of engineers and technicians, scientists, harvesters, livestock raisers, tractor drivers, combine operators, and members of the agricultural intelligentsia.[21] Once again, only "activists" were enrolled in the Party, and the number of persons refused admission was fairly large. In Moscow, for example, 22.4% of the total applicants in 1947 were turned down, and this figure had risen to 46.9% in 1948.[22] As a result, the growth of the Party was halted to all practical purposes, and between 1947 and October 1952 it increased by only 880,000, an average of 160,000 per year. There are no precise data to show the type of persons enrolled in the Party during this period of "strict selection," but certain information published in the Soviet press shows that the number of workers declined. Thus, of the total members enrolled in the Moscow city organization in the first half of 1948, only 32% were workers, the remaining 68% being salaried employees and intelligentsia.[23] Figures available for Belorussia and Georgia are analagous, and between October 1952 and January 1954 the number of salaried employees and intellectuals among new Party members in Belorussia was 57.4% of the whole,[24] while in Georgia they comprised 59% in 1952.[25] Although such a situation was beneficial to the Party from the practical point of view, the Party leaders were still evidently worried by the ethical side of the question. This gave rise to the special resolution of the Party Presidium at the Twentieth Party Congress to increase the "nucleus of workers within the Party."[26]

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Figures published at the Twentieth Party Congress show that of a total of 7,215,595 Party members, 4,779,607, or two-thirds, had completed or at least started either a higher or secondary education.[27] None of these, of course, are manual workers. Furthermore, this two-thirds will be considerably augmented

[19] *Pravda*, October 6, 1952.

[20] *Voprosy istorii*, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 65.

[23] *Ibid.*, p.66.

[24] *Sovetskaya Belorussiya*, Minsk, February 13, 1954.

[25] *Zarya Vostoka*, Tbilisi, September 18, 1952.

[26] *Ibid.*, January 28, 1958.

[27] *XX sezd KPSS : Stenograficheskiy otchet* (The Twentieth Party Congress: Stenographic Report), Moscow, 1956, vol. 1, p. 237.

by persons from lower educational groups who distinguished themselves at their work and were able to establish themselves in their respective positions. As to the professions of Party members, no exact statistics are available. The Twentieth Party Congress merely reported that on January 1, 1956 Party membership included 1,877,773 specialists with higher and secondary education.[28] Similarly, there is no information available to show how these specialists are divided. The last, meager data is no more recent than January 1, 1947, when there were 148,000 engineers, 24,000 agronomists, 40,000 doctors, and 80,000 professors and teachers.[29] A more recent analysis, admittedly on the basis of incomplete information, gives the following breakdown of Party membership by profession:[30]

Industry, Mining, Transportation, etc.	2,600,000 (36%)
Agriculture	1,400,000 (19%)
Political and Administrative Apparatuses	1,500,000 (20%)
Culture (Education, Medicine, Research)	700,000 (10%)
Armed Forces and Police	1,000,000 (14%)
Total	7,200,000

This overall figure would appear to be essentially correct. However, no absolutely correct picture is likely until the Soviets themselves publish the relevant statistics. But in general, it may be inferred from the very secrecy surrounding such figures that attempts to regulate the Party's growth have been a failure. The Central Committee, it would seem, is anxious not to tell the world that the Soviet Communist Party is a party of state bureaucracy.

Naturally, every state must have an administrative apparatus, but insofar as the Soviet state apparatus combines the functions of government, employer, and distributor, the Soviet bureaucracy cannot be compared with that of any other country. Simplifying the question somewhat, but without departing from the truth, it may be said that in the West the state exists for the people and the bureaucracy for the state, while in the USSR the people exist for the state and the state for the bureaucracy. This is the reason the theory of the withering away of the state has proved Utopian under Soviet conditions. The gradual but willful extension of the functions and sphere of activity of the state apparatus is one of the laws of Soviet socialism, functioning independently of the centralization or decentralization of the bureaucratic army's leading organs which takes place from time to time. The ruling class no longer consists of mere bureaucrats, as it did formerly, but of "diplomaed bureaucrats" with good educational qualifications.

Statistics available for the republics of Latvia, Tadzhikistan, Moldavia, Azerbaidzhan, Turkmenia, Armenia, and Georgia show that of their Party *aktiv* two-thirds are bureaucrats and intellectuals by birth and that nearly 80% of its members

[28] *Ibid.*

[29] *Partiinaya zhizn*, No. 20 (1947), p. 83.

[30] *The American Slavic and East European Review*, New York, No. 3 (1957), p. 289.

have higher or secondary education.[31] Moreover, whereas at the beginning of the 1920's and 1930's Party and government workers who had received a Party education had been in an absolute majority, today they do not make up even half of the oblast and republic Party *aktiv*. Once again specialists in various fields are in a majority among the Party and government workers. Economic administrative officials, of course, are almost invariably specialists. As an illustration figures for the Georgian Communist Party may be quoted. The Georgian Party *aktiv* was represented at the Eighteenth Party Congress by 813 delegates, of whom 175 were Party workers; 154, government workers; 26, Komsomol and trade union workers; 67, directors of factories and construction projects; 18, directors of sovkhozes and MTS; 15, education and public health workers; 17, sovnarkhoz workers; 80, professors, teachers, and artists; 55, generals and high-ranking officers; 116, kolkhozniks (including kolkhoz chairmen and former kolkhozniks); and 78, workers (including former workers). The delegates included the following specialists: 140 engineers, 94 agronomists and animal husbandry specialists, 17 jurists, 31 economists, 16 doctors, and 195 university and institute graduates whose specialty was not indicated. Georgians or representatives of other Georgian nationalities made up 90.3% of the delegates, while Russians or Ukrainians totaled 9.7%.[32]

As for the Party membership of the Soviet Union as a whole, the following picture can be obtained: On January 1, 1949, there were over 600,000 members in the Moscow Party organization, while in 1950 it had the following activists:[33]

Secretaries of Primary Organizations	6,000
Members of Party Committees and Party Bureaus	29,000
Secretaries of Party Shop Organizations and Group Organizers	19,000
Total	54,000

In the Communist Party as a whole, with a membership of 7,200,000, this would amount to 648,000–the "noncommissioned officer corps," to use Stalin's terminology–of whom approximately 350,000 are secretaries or group organizers of primary organizations.

The "officer corps," members of raion and city committees, numbers 250,000, according to official statistics, while the Party "generals," members of oblast, krai, and union republic Party central committees, total 20,000.[34] This means that the Party *aktiv*, from the primary organizations to the Central Committee, has roughly 918,000 members, of whom the leading *aktiv*, the "officer corps" and Party "generals," totals some 270,000. These 270,000 essentially constitute a party within the Party.

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[31] *Sovetskaya Latviya*, Riga, January 25, 1958; *Kommunist Tadzhikistana*, Stalinabad, January 16, 1958; *Zarya Vostoka*, January 28, 1958; *Sovetskaya Moldaviya*, Kishinev, January 30, 1958; *Bakinsky rabochy*, Baku, January 29, 1958; *Turkmenskaya iskra*, Ashkhabad, January 20, 1958; *Kommunist*, Erevan, January 27, 1958.

[32] *Zarya Vostoka*, *op. cit.*

[33] *Voprosy istorii*, *op. cit.*, pp. 68 and 72.

[34] *Partiinaya zhizn*, No. 20 (1957), p. 92.

The Party bureaucracy is organized according to a hierarchical system and concentrated in the "secretarial corps" and as such is above the "committee corps." In other words, it is above the leading *aktiv* on its own level. To ensure that the "secretarial corps" can successfully direct the "committee corps" it is by statute independent of the committees. The "secretarial corps" has a great degree of independence due to the method of its composition. To begin with, Party secretaries are not really elected (the existing electoral procedure with an open ballot is a mere formality), but appoint each other: the secretariat of the Central Committee appoints the secretaries of union republic Party central committees, who in turn appoint the oblast committees secretaries; these appoint the city and raion committee secretaries, who in turn appoint the secretaries of primary organizations. It is true these appointments are called "recommendations" and "approvals," but this does not alter the situation, particularly as this method is fixed by the Party statutes themselves.[35]

The statutes protect the rights and privileges not only of the secretaries, but of the entire "committee corps" from encroachment by the rank and file. The relevant paragraph states:

> A primary Party organization cannot make a decision on the expulsion of a Communist from the Party if he is a member of the Party Central Committee, the central committee of a union republic Communist Party, or a krai, oblast, okrug, city, or raion Party committee.[36]

Clearly, a body with such wide powers must itself be well qualified. This is in fact the case here. Figures are not available for all grades of the "secretarial corps," but official statistics for raion committee secretaries would support this view:

Educational Qualification of Raion Committee Secretaries

(Percentage of Total)

	First Secretaries		— Secretaries —	
	1946	1954	1946	1954
Higher Education	12.2	24.3	9.9	14.7
Secondary and Uncompleted Higher Education	40.3	70.4	40.4	79.1
Primary and Uncompleted Secondary Education	47.5	5.3	49.6	6.2

NOTE: The 1946 figures for secretaries add up to 99.9%, as in the source.
SOURCE: *Partiinaya zhizn*, No. 9 (1954), p. 10.

Thus, between 1946 and 1954 the number of raion committee secretaries with higher, uncompleted higher, or secondary education rose from 50%–52% to 93%–95%, with a correspondingly steep decline in the number with only primary education. More recent data indicate that this process is continuing. At the beginning of 1958, 72% of the raion committee secretaries in the Estonian SSR had completed their higher education.[37] No complete statistics for oblast committee and union republic central committees are available, but again it would seem that

[35] *Ustav KPSS* (The Soviet Communist Party Statutes), Moscow, 1952, paras. 42 and 50.
[36] *Ibid.*, para. 11.
[37] *Sovetskaya Estoniya*, Tallinn, January 29, 1958.

almost all their secretaries have had a higher education. For example, in the Turkmenian Communist Party 79.3% of the leading workers (not merely the secretaries) of the present oblast committees and the republic's central committee have had a higher education, while 15.5% had an uncompleted higher education. Moreover, two-thirds of the republic's secretaries are Turkmenian.[38]

The "secretarial corps" includes a wide variety of specialists: engineers, agronomists, lawyers, teachers, and so on. True, they were promoted as Communist-specialists, rather than as specialist-Communists, but their knowledge enables them both to organize and direct the process of production.

Relations between the various groups within the Soviet Communist Party are by no means idyllic: there are, in fact, three types of friction; that of a general nature between the Party rank and file and the ruling *aktiv*, specific professional friction between groups within the ruling *aktiv* (between the secretarial and the committee corps), and friction between the Party and the people.

Differences among individual social groups within the ruling *aktiv* appear mainly on the legal plane. Legally, the subordinate bureaucracy, the government cadres, controls the organs of government. In fact, however, the organs of government merely duplicate decisions made by the Party apparatus, and their heads merely carry out the orders and decrees issued by the leaders of the parallel Party organs on the same level, the Party cadres. Thus, the state is in the hands of two parallel apparatuses, one narrow but having the leading role (the Party apparatus), the other wide but technical (the state apparatus). In this dualism of government lies one of the whole system's internal contradictions, a contradiction which is smoothed over only at the very top with the combination of the duties of Party first secretary and head of the government. Differences between the Party bureaucracy and the subordinate bureaucracy are further aggravated by the fact that within the organs of government administration, including economic administration, there are specialists who have better qualifications than the members of the Party apparatus. Admittedly, as already pointed out, the Party apparatus itself has been improved as far as quality is concerned with the introduction of numerous specialists. This can be seen from the Presidium of the Party Central Committee, for example, 9 of whose 15 members are specialists: two, trade experts; two, economists; and five, engineers. But the subordinate bureaucracy, which heads enterprises, sovnarkhozes, ministries, committees, and so on, is superior in its qualifications, but only in its qualifications; its functions are purely technical. The Party apparatus not only makes laws and fixes norms, but even dictates production methods down to the smallest detail. The constant dissension this causes is a feature of the day-to-day functioning of the Party-government administrative dualism. However, this dissension is between ruling groups seeking real equality within the framework and on the basis of the existing regime. These groups are united in the defense of their interests against the mass of Party members and the people as a whole.

[38] *Turkmenskaya iskra*, January 20, 1958.

The Party bureaucrats regained complete control of the political police after destroying its old leadership, reorganizing it, and appointing Party functionaries to all the key positions. This does not mean that the Soviet state has ceased to be a police state, but merely that the police itself has ceased to be omnipotent.

The Marxist fanatics of Lenin's day have long since disappeared from the ruling class, whose members have learnt a few simple, standard formulas of Marxist doctrine, which they set up as dogmatic truths which need not be understood, but must be accepted without question. Earlier, a certain, albeit superficial faith in Party doctrines was obligatory, but the dethronement of Stalin struck an irreparable blow even at this faith. Complete inner freedom from a real belief in the truth of even its own doctrines has become not only a typical feature of, but a driving force behind the ruling class of the Stalinist school.

The same applies to the ethics of the ruling class. Stalin raised persons to this class over the dead bodies of millions of their fellow countrymen, or even of friends and relatives. This has had its effect on the psychology of this class: atrophy of ordinary human feelings, contempt for the individual, subservience to authority, cold cruelty towards the weak, absolute freedom from all moral obligations are characteristic of the class as a whole.

What then is the ruling class' ideal? The answer is simple: power, unlimited and undivided. The members of the new class are not ideologists, but technologists of power and ruling. And inasmuch as the well-being and indeed the very existence of the ruling class is dependent on the existence of an absolute power, no limitation of this power can be tolerated. However, the forms and methods of government within the framework of the dictatorship can and do undergo considerable change. Under Stalin things were simpler: preventive terror in politics and a rigid maximum for the standard of living in economics were his tried and trusted methods. Under the new regime, terror is no longer preventive and the standard of living is not subject to Stalin's maximum. The ruling class today regards a general rise in the Soviet standard of living, particularly the liberalization of the economic policy carried out in rural areas, as one of the chief means of strengthening its own power. To a certain, temporary degree this will also have favorable results for the regime itself. However, as soon as earning his living ceases to be a major problem for the Soviet citizen, a new problem arises, that of freedom. In this respect the economic concessions that have had to be made to the people are pregnant with fateful consequences.

By altering traditional methods, reorganizing the bureaucratic machine, and redistributing power between the central and peripheral Party bureaucracies, the Kremlin reformers are hoping to modernize the system of government. But even if sincere, the mere desire to control the Stalinist system for any length of time without recourse to Stalin's methods can never be anything but Utopian. The new regime's reforms are bound to enter a critical phase as soon as both rulers and people realize that a reform of the methods of government will not achieve its aim as long as the system of ruling remains inviolable.

However, can it remain inviolable? On the one hand, the ruling class will never voluntarily impose any limitations on its own power, and therefore from this point of view there can be no question of the regime's evolution towards the establishment of a system based on legal equality; but on the other hand, the regime might find itself in such a position that the consequences of its own reforms make it imperative for it to widen its social basis.

In any case, the present period of "enlightened Stalinism" is one of transition–either back to classical Stalinism, in which case the rehabilitation of Stalinist methods in politics, economics, and ideology will become essential, or forward, away from Stalinism, which will inevitably mean the introduction of some measure of spiritual freedom. The Kremlin knows only too well that there is no third choice.

(This article is based on a report given by the author at the Institute's conference in Munich on July 25–26, 1958.)

CURRENT SOVIET AFFAIRS

The Economy

The Organization of Soviet Research

Soviet nonmilitary research institutes can be divided into three basic categories: (1) the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and its institutes, plus the republic academies of sciences and branch academies (medicine, agriculture, building and architecture, urban economy, and so on). These do theoretical work on major scientific problems; (2) branch research institutes and specialist industrial designing bureaus working on technical problems and the practical application of the results of the above-mentioned institutes' theoretical work. These do not engage in major research; and (3) factory laboratories, designing offices, and experimental shops, all engaged in such practical problems as the improvement of materials and finished products and the introduction of new technological processes.

The Academy of Sciences of the USSR, including here its institutes and the republic academies of sciences, is the country's major research center and is responsible directly to the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Working conditions are the best possible, the pressure of departmental interests and bureaucracy in general is not so strong as elsewhere, and there is more contact and exchange of information between persons engaged in different spheres of study.[1]

In the Soviet Union research in the natural and technical sciences has always been well ahead of practical application, for reasons inherent in the system of totalitarian Communist dictatorship. Centralized planning and supervision has meant that the country's research centers are subordinate to a number of different governmental organs. Thus, although on the all-union level the Academy of Sciences is directly subordinate only to the Council of Ministers, on other levels the specialist academies are subordinate both to the corresponding ministries and to governmental committees, while the branch research institutes and specialist industrial designing bureaus are shared by numerous organs, of which the main ones are Gosplan of the USSR, the 15 union republic gosplans, the all-union ministries, the branch committees of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the republic ministries, the committees set up by the councils of ministers of the union republics, and the 104 sovnarkhozes (economic councils). The work of the research institutes and bureaus is coordinated by the State Scientific and Technical Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and similar committees in the union republic councils of ministers. In addition to providing scientific and technical information, these committees lay down the main lines of development of science and technology and supervise the practical application of the more important inventions. However, in practice there is little or no coordination since not even the State Scientific and Technical Committee has the right to issue decrees and directives, but is virtually limited to "consultations and recommendations."

[1] *Pravda*, February 14, 1956.

Moreover, it has no direct control over such important items as finance and supply, which are in the hands of the Ministry of Finance and Gosplan respectively. The whole system of finance and supply is cumbersome, bureaucratic, and completely divorced from the needs of the scientific establishments concerned. This in turn retards the rate of progress and delays the practical application of new designs and technological processes. Finally, there is no question of the committees examining the research establishments' work plans; this is done by the corresponding institutes of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, its branches, the republic academies of sciences, the major scientific establishments of those branches of industry which engage in research, and the central government organs, such as Gosplan, ministries, and committees.

In the USSR there are no special institutes for coordinating research and designing work within each branch of industry. Each branch usually has several centers engaged in similar work, but some of them come under Gosplan, some under the various sovnarkhozes, and others under the Academy of Sciences, and so on. The Soviet press has frequently quoted cases of this type of uneconomical dispersion of manpower and material. For example, there are many organizations helping to design and perfect mining machinery, but research is so split up that many problems in the all-round mechanization of mining have not yet been solved. Then again, research in electric locomotive building is carried out without any coordination between the organizations concerned: the Ministry of Ways of Communication, the designing bureau of the Novocherkassk Electric Locomotive Works, and the research section of the electro-technical industry. The result is that technical faults and shortcomings in design have not been eliminated.[2] In March 1957, *Izvestia* published an article showing that research into metal-processing by the use of pressure was being carried out by numerous scientific institutes and factory laboratories, and that thousands of researchers and engineers were involved. The article complained that this duplication meant that none of the organizations concerned was able to work really effectively, since the manpower, equipment and resources, and finances were split up.[3] A group of Soviet engineers wrote in *Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta* that during the past two years ten more research institutes and designing bureaus had been set up to study the problem of automation in industry. However, these too are subordinate to different organs, which set them tasks mainly of local importance, thereby drastically reducing their value. The engineers felt that there should be a single center to coordinate the research and designing work being carried out in the field of automation and instrument making. They concluded with the admission that

> to date we are still carrying out few practical measures in the field of automation, although new achievements in physics, chemistry, mechanics, mathematics, and so on are constantly extending the possibilities of production automation.[4]

Although experiments are of the utmost importance in research and the development of industrial techniques, to date the facilities for experimenting at both

[2] *Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, February 21 and 26, 1958.

[3] *Izvestia*, March 20, 1957.

[4] *Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, February 9, 1958.

research and industrial centers are not what they should be in view of the technological progress being made. One of the main reasons for this is excessive centralization. Member of the Academy of Sciences of the Georgian SSR E. Andronikashvili wrote:

> The need to approach the central offices over every question, even those of secondary importance, means that the reorganization of the basis of research in the most important institutes drags on in the union republics for many years. In individual cases it was finally completed only when the research question already posed had to a considerable degree lost its meaning. . . . The process of improving and renewing the basis for research must go much quicker than at present.[5]

Another problem is supply. The director of one research institute wrote that apparatus frequently being manufactured on an experimental basis is often needed but cannot be obtained. The result is that the institutes themselves have to make the necessary equipment, which cannot but be of inferior quality and extremely expensive.[6] This was borne out by vice-president of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR I. Bardin, who complained that "the overwhelming majority of the branches of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and of the republic academies are poorly equipped as far as modern research equipment is concerned."[7]

It is obvious that the administrative system makes really close liaison between the research institutes of any particular branch of industry and the institutes of the Academy of Sciences on the one hand and the factory laboratories and designing bureaus on the other virtually impossible. Member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR A. V. Topchiev wrote on this subject:

> Experimental shops and equipment in enterprises are, of course, essential. But they will produce the greatest effect only if we are able to create an active, creative friendship between the workers in the academic and branch institutes and the enormous army of specialists in the enterprises.[8]

The fact that research and designing establishments are largely cut off from the production enterprises and regions for which they are working has a retarding effect, particularly in the practical application of the results of research to production. The majority of these establishments are in Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev, although they may be carrying out orders for Siberia, the Urals, the Far East, or Central Asia. This means that local conditions are not always taken into consideration, and to date the sovnarkhozes do not appear to have been able to effect an improvement. Thus, although there is a highly developed machine-building industry in many parts of the country, for example, in the Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk, Gorky, and Donbas regions, none of them has an organization engaged in research into machine building.

In spite of the decision to decentralize branch research institutes so as to bring them nearer to the centers of production, their distribution is by no means balanced, and the problem seems far from being solved. At present, although the

[5] *Izvestia*, May 5, 1957.
[6] *Pravda*, March 23, 1958.
[7] *Ibid.*, April 28, 1957.
[8] *Ibid.*, June 6, 1958.

number of such establishments dropped to 2,756 in 1957 from the 1956 figure of 2,797,[9] the number in the central regions continues to increase. Leningrad, for instance, has presently more than 250, about 90% of whose work is for other economic regions, while Kazakhstan, where industrial development is progressing rapidly, has in fact no research capacity.

The manpower situation is analagous. The research institutes now run by the sovnarkhozes sometimes cannot function on their own simply because they do not have the necessary staff. There are reports in the Soviet specialist press of vacancies in heavy industrial research and designing organizations and so on, but these posts are mainly in the country's eastern regions. Moreover, such complex tasks as the automation of major installations in the field of metallurgy, power, machine building, and so on has generally proved to be beyond the capabilities of the engineers and technicians employed by most enterprises.[10]

The staffs of the research institutes are frequently chosen not so much according to their ability, but on the basis of their political reliability and personal contacts. In all cases, the final word in the selection of personnel lies with the relevant Party organ. Moreover, centralized planning and bureaucracy damps personal initiative as well as preventing researchers and engineers from working directly in their particular fields because of the need for them to participate in the compilation, examination, and ratification of production plans, a process which can take as long as six months. Even *Pravda* has complained that engineering and technical staff have to spend too much time on correspondence, forms, and reports.[11]

The bureaucracy described in Dudintsev's now well-known novel *Not By Bread Alone* can easily be shown to be founded on fact, for there are innumerable instances of suggestions or inventions made by individuals or institutes not being examined for years. Thus, a certain Khlabuzar invented a coking oven 17% more productive than existing ovens and yielding higher quality coke. The decision to build the first model was first taken in 1950, ratified again in 1955, but to date nothing has been done practically.[12] The PP-110 pneumatic drill, tested in 1955 and clearly having great possibilities, is still not being manufactured on a large scale.[13] Finally, in 1938, a professor Stepanov discovered a method for making various types of bands, rods, and pipes from molten metal, without casting. Even though many prominent scientists encouraged him and his experiments have been completed, his invention has still not received official sanction.[14] Such examples could be repeated almost indefinitely.

[9] *Kulturnoe stroitelstvo SSSR : Statisticheskiy sbornik* (The Cultural Make-up of the USSR: A Statistical Compilation), Moscow, 1956, p. 245; *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1956 godu : Statisticheskiy ezhegodnik* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1956: A Statistical Yearbook), Moscow, 1956, p. 257; *Dostizheniya sovetskoi vlasti za 40 let v tsifrakh : Statisticheskiy sbornik* (Forty Years of the Achievements of Soviet Power in Figures), Moscow, 1957, p. 284.

[10] *Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, February 9, 1958.

[11] *Pravda*, February 6, 1958.

[12] *Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, February 12, 1958.

[13] *Ibid.*, February 14, 1958.

[14] *Ibid.*, April 27, 1958.

A further point is that many directors of enterprises are simply not interested in experimenting with new equipment, since they do not have the necessary experimental shops and refuse to carry out tests in the ordinary production shops as this would reduce planned output. On the other hand, enterprises which do experimental work are frequently incommoded by the fact that planning organizations often set targets for the production of new products before the results of the tests carried out on the prototypes have been completed.

A serious brake on the rate of technological progress in the USSR is the government's commitments to other countries. Large numbers of Soviet scientists and engineers have been sent to work in the Soviet-bloc countries, Asia, and the Near and Middle East. On January 19, 1958, *Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta* reported that thousands of Soviet specialists were working in these countries or at least fulfilling orders for them. Thus, a Sino-Soviet agreement on scientific and technical cooperation concluded in January 1958 stipulated that Soviet scientists and engineers were to work on more than a hundred scientific and technological problems for China. Then again, Soviet specialists are to build 40 industrial enterprises and 8 power stations, carry out geological exploration, build mines and railroads, set up 16 establishments for training qualified personnel, and carry out research work in Egypt.[15]

Thus, the effectiveness of Soviet civil research is considerably lessened by shortcomings determined by faults in the Soviet system itself, and by the government's domestic political policy. At the May 1958 plenary session of the Party Central Committee Khrushchev himself admitted that there were serious shortcomings in the organization of research and experimental work: the irrational division of men and resources, duplication, inadequate liaison between research and industry, the absence of adequate facilities for experimenting in many scientific establishments and productive enterprises, poor supervision, bureaucracy, and even lack of interest by scientists and engineers in the development of science and technology.[16] The result is that the general level of technological development in the USSR is not as high as would appear at first glance. Many branches of technology are still lagging far behind their counterparts in the more advanced Western countries both in quality and quantity. For example, more than 40% of all Soviet machine tools are still nonautomatic, a type which is still being manufactured; in 1957, the transportation machinery industry's orders for new machine tools was fulfilled by only 36%, the automobile, radio, and electrotechnical industries' by only 25%, and the road-building materials industry's by even less. Many major enterprises throughout the country still do not possess specialized machine tools.[17] As one of the heads of the State Committee for Building Affairs N. Zubkov stated: "There has to date been no large-scale modernization and renewal of equipment at machine-building factories. As yet only in individual cases has productive capacity been increased in this way."[18]

[15] *Ibid.*

[16] *Pravda*, May 10, 1958.

[17] *Izvestia*, December 3, 1957; *Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, January 22, 1958.

[18] *Pravda*, March 10, 1958.

The most advanced enterprises technologically are held to be the tractor, automobile, and bearing factories, but even then much of their equipment is 25 years old.[19] In the tractor factories, for example, only 33% of all machine tools are less than 20 years old.[20] The bearings presently being manufactured are not meeting technical requirements and long ago lagged behind the best types produced by foreign firms for length of wear.[21] Automation is still in an embryonic state, and has so far been applied only to individual machines and processes. Only hydroelectric power stations have complete automation. The main difficulties in this field is the lack of personnel with the proper training and the shortage of equipment.[22] Remote control is also not widespread.

A problem still unsolved is that of meeting factories' internal transportation needs–the moving of loads from shop to shop and so on. This work is done entirely by hand, even in new factories. In most branches of industry this and other forms of subsidiary work are not mechanized. There is in fact a vast disproportion between the level of mechanization of the main and subsidiary work. For example, in the chemical industry only 16.6% of the total number of workers are engaged in productive work; the rest do subsidiary jobs. Even in the machine-building industry 40% of the overall amount of work performed is done by hand.[23] Technologically, the food and light industries are quite backward, particularly the textile industry, which, according to Soviet economists, would require 12 to 20 years to bring its equipment up to date.[24]

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The comparatively unfavorable scene as far as civil research is concerned is certainly not duplicated on the military front. The Soviet government is concentrating its efforts on increasing the USSR's military potential in an effort to attain world superiority. Therefore, development of science and technology is being primarily linked not with any effort to improve the country's standard of living, but with furthering the Soviet position on the international scene. This is indeed a part of the Communist doctrine on war:

> The struggle for qualitative and quantitative military technological superiority, particularly in aviation, atomic and thermonuclear weapons, tanks and artillery, the struggle for the creation of a powerful and independent basis for a war economy becomes of outstanding importance in the event of a war. . .[25]
>
> Military technological superiority will be a reliable factor towards victory only when it is created at a quicker rate than the enemy's.[26]

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[19] *Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, January 22, 1958.

[20] *Pravda*, December 13, 1957.

[21] *Ibid.*, January 12, 1956; *Izvestia*, December 3, 1957.

[22] *Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, February 9, 1958.

[23] V. Sominsky, *O tekhnicheskom progresse promyshlennosti SSSR* (Technical Progress in Soviet Industry), Moscow, 1957, p. 174.

[24] *Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, March 7, 1958.

[25] V. Sominsky, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

[26] G. Pokrovsky, *Nauka i tekhnika v sovremennykh voinakh* (Science and Technology in Modern Warfare), Moscow, 1956, p. 75.

The training of the various types of engineers takes place in higher military training establishments–institutes, academies, and senior officers' schools–which also have advancement courses for men who have already qualified as engineers. All these schools are under the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, which is also in charge of the engineers trained at special military departments in a number of civil higher educational establishments. No statistical data on the subject has been published.

The special military academies occupy a place of their own in the system of higher military training establishments of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR. They turn out senior officiers trained in the technical sciences and military technology. At present there are in the USSR in addition to military academies specializing in problems of command, politics, law, medicine, veterinary science, and finance, the following specialized technical academies: the Zhukovsky and Mozhaisk aviation engineering academies; the Stalin Academy for Armored and Mechanized Forces; the Krylov Naval Academy for Shipbuilding and Armaments; the Dzerzhinsky Artillery Academy; the Marshal Govorov Artillery Radio Academy; the Kuibyshev Engineering Academy; the Marshal Budenny Communications Academy; an academy of technology; a rear and transportation academy; the Marshal Voroshilov Academy for Chemical Defense; and the Academy of Artillery Sciences.[27] They all have three main tasks: to train technicians in various specialties, to train highly qualified instructors and technical specialists, and to do research in the field of arms and equipment.

The Academy of Artillery Sciences, founded in 1946, is of particular importance, engaging in research not only on the conventional weapons–rifles, pistols, submachine guns, machine guns, cannons, howitzers, mortars–but also on rocket artillery installations. It also directs a number of institutes which carry out practical experiments. It is known that two of the leading Soviet specialists in missile technology, A. A. Blagonravov and G. I. Pokrovsky are members of it, the former being its president.

Unlike the nonmilitary branches of the Soviet economy, the military sector has its research and designing work strictly coordinated and supervised by special committees under the Ministry of Defense. Attached to the military academies and other military research institutes and designing bureaus are leading scientific establishments which direct their work and provide them with assistance.

The research institutes and designing bureaus work closely with their counterparts in the corresponding ministries and departments. Aircraft designer A. I. Mikoyan wrote that in the construction of airplanes, for example, specialists from all the cognate fields of knowledge work as a team.[28] Member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR A. Berg wrote that "the chief credit in the building and launching of the first artificial satellite goes, of course, to the specialists and

[27] *Krasnaya zvezda*, January 18, 1952; June 15 and 29, September 7 and 26, October 2 and 30, 1957; January 23, March 18 and 23, 1958; S. Shtraikh, *Aleksei Nikolaevich Krylov: Ocherk zhizni i deyatelnosti* (Aleksei Nikolaevich Krylov: An Outline of his Life and Work), Moscow, 1956, p. 5.

[28] *Sovetsky patriot*, September 15 and 18, 1957.

designers in [the field of] jet technology who, in conjunction with metallurgists, physicists, chemists, and specialists in thermotechnics and radioelectronics, created the powerful missile."[29] Pokrovsky wrote in his book *Science and Technology in Modern Warfare*:

> Modern military affairs can be built on a firm scientific basis, they must develop constantly, move forward, be supplemented with ever newer data. Provision for a future war can be made only by using the aggregate of the data of all the natural and social sciences. From this standpoint military affairs are in greater need of deep scientific foundations than any other sphere of man's social activities.[30]

The Soviet government is certainly taking this standpoint in the effort to create new types of military equipment and weapons, and is mobilizing the country's finest scientific brains regardless of the branch of the economy they are engaged in. Tasks laid down by the military agencies are given top priority and the best men, material, and equipment available are employed to fulfill them. Moreover, special centralized organizations are set up to help solve any important technological problems of military importance, in any sphere.

Many institutes of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR have been recruited to work at problems of military significance. The Academy of Sciences' Atomic Energy Institute is in charge of several teams of scientists and engineers presently working on the problem of a controlled nuclear reaction. Of the 13 institutes in the recently formed Siberian branch of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 9 are to do research into atomic energy, thermonuclear reaction, the effects of high pressure, strain, and heat, radiotechnology, electronics, and mechanics. It is interesting to note that the Academy of Sciences numbers among its members persons presently on active military service with ranks as high as general or admiral.

It has already been pointed out that the Soviet machine-building industry is by no means completely modernized. Nevertheless, it is able to provide enterprises working on military orders with the most up-to-date equipment and machine tools. The aviation industry, for instance, is very well equipped, and any special machines or tools required are provided regardless of the cost.

In sum, the faults inherent in the totalitarian Communist system–centralism and bureaucracy–make it impossible for it to ensure the successful and all-round development of every branch of the economy; on the other hand, this same centralism permits effective concentration on particular spheres. As a result, although the Soviet Union is lagging far behind the other leading nations in the output of consumer goods, it is leading the world in the output of certain types of new weapons.

Joseph J. Baritz

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[29] *Pravda*, October 17, 1957.

[30] G. Pokrovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

The Soviet Shipbuilding Industry

Russia's shipbuilding industry, founded by Peter the Great at the end of the seventeenth century, progressed slowly, reaching its first peak on the eve of the 1917 Revolution, when the yards at St. Petersburg, Reval, Riga, Nikolaev, and Sevastopol could build battleships of 32,000 tons, fast, light cruisers, large, powerful destroyers, and submarines in reasonable time and of good quality. The Revolution, however, destroyed most of the shipbuilding industry and dispersed the skilled manpower accumulated painstakingly over many years. The Soviets spent the years up to 1928 rebuilding already existing yards, and although a few warships on the stocks since 1914 were launched and some merchant ships built, total output remained very small. During the First Five-Year Plan (1928–1932) work was again begun on submarines, torpedo boats, and other small craft, and a few merchant ships were constructed. The Second Five-Year Plan (1933–1937) saw the building of even more submarines, the first new destroyers and cruisers, and more merchant ships. It was planned to increase the tonnage of the merchant marine by 576,000 gross tons, to add 2,512,000 gross tons of river barges, and to build self-propelled river craft with a total of 250,000 hp. Between 1929 and 1937, the Soviets claim to have launched about 850,000 gross tons of warship-tonnage, but this would appear excessive in view of the fact that only 480 vessels were built. However, by the end of the Second Five-Year Plan the building capacity of the Soviet shipyards may have reached about 750,000 gross tons, made up of about 500,000 tons of barges, 100,000 tons of seagoing merchant ships, 100,000 tons of warships, and some 50,000 tons of self-propelled river vessels. The Third Five-Year Plan (1938–1941) witnessed yet another increase, and in 1941, 929 merchant ships, tugs, and so on with 511,220 gross tons were under construction, of which 558, with a total of 210,063 gross tons, were to be commisioned in 1941, while in 1940, 170 surface warships were commissioned.

The Soviets also created the first large Far Eastern shipbuilding yard at Komsomolsk and revived the old Russian yards at Archangel and Murmansk, while some yards along the Volga built ships for the Caspian Sea.

During World War II, 98 Soviet yards were destroyed, a shattering blow to the country's shipbuilding industry, and it took about five years to rebuild the yards at Leningrad, Odessa, Nikolaev, Sevastopol, and a number of other places. Materials captured from the Germans and allied deliveries helped in the task. The prewar production capacity was attained about 1949, and new yards were built in the Baltic states, the Far East, on numerous rivers, and in the Arctic region.

Today, the total number of shipbuilding and repair yards is possibly in the region of 1,000, of which about half are able to build at least launches for military or general use. The other yards are either very small or are mainly kept busy with repair work. Only about 30 slipways are available for the construction of warships and merchant vessels of 1,000 tons and above. The number of slipways for inland vessels and barges is not known exactly, but may be around 1,000, and almost as many may exist for the construction of motor launches and small fishing boats.

The main shipbuilding center is Leningrad, with seven large yards and over a dozen smaller ones producing about 160,000 tons of shipping per year and employing over 230,000 workers. The large ones are (1) the Sergo Ordzhonikidze yard, formerly known as Baltiisky Zavod, which can build vessels up to 290 meters long and weighing 33,000 tons; (2) the Marti yard, formerly the Franco-Russe yard, which has slipways up to 200 meters in length and can build ships up to 28,000 tons (the name may have been changed recently); (3) the Sudomekh yard, formerly the New Admiralty yard, which has some slipways up to 250 meters long, completely enclosed and thus protected against the weather, and able to launch ships up to 22,000 tons; (4) the Zhdanov yard, formerly known as the Putilov Works, which, it is claimed, can build ships up to 40,000 tons; and (5) the Kanonersky, Nevsky, and Krasny Flot yards.

Since 1950, these yards have built about 12 cruisers, over 1,000 submarines, and about the same number of destroyers and escort vessels. Since 1955, when the bulk of the large number of warships slated for construction had already been launched, they concentrated on 8,000-ton tankers and other merchant ships. Tankers of 37,000 gross tons are on the stocks at the Sergo Ordzhonikidze yard, and cargo vessels of 10,000 gross tons are projected. Owing to the shallowness of the river Neva and the Leningrad-Kronstadt canal, larger ships cannot be fitted out completely at the yards along the Neva, but have to be towed to Kronstadt, where there are several dry and floating docks.

Since the war, new shipyards have been opened and existing ones enlarged in Riga, Reval, Liepaja, Kaliningrad, and Vyborg, but they are still restricted to the construction of smaller warships, tugs, coasters, and launches. The main shipbuilding center in the Black Sea area is Nikolaev, where the I. I. Nosenko yard and yard No. 61 have slipways up to 250 meters long and can construct vessels up to 55,000 gross tons, while several destroyers and submarines can be built simultaneously in the covered sheds there. In Odessa several yards are engaged in the construction and repair of medium-sized merchant ships, tugs, and landing craft. The naval base at Sevastopol has mainly repair yards with dry and floating docks, but there are also a few slipways for the construction of light warships. Numerous new shipyards have been built along the shores of the Sea of Azov, at Zhdanov, Rostov, Osipenko, and Taganrog, and the Black Sea, at Novorossiisk, where the Turbine yard is said to be capable of building ships of 14,000 tons, and the repair yards of Batumi, Poti and Tuapse have been rebuilt.

Owing to comparatively favorable climatic conditions and the fact that raw material and a source of power are near at hand, the total output of the Black Sea yards is not far behind that of the Baltic yards, somewhere in the region of 150,000 gross tons as against 200,000. In the Far East, the most efficient shipyard is at Komsomolsk-na-Amure. Built before World War II at a cost of 230,000,000 rubles, it has several slipways where cruisers and merchant ships up to about 18,000 gross tons can be constructed. It must be remembered that the shallow estuary of the Amur limits the draught of all vessels to 8 meters. A new repair yard at Petropavlovsk cost 1,000,000 rubles and another at Nakhodka, 8,000,000. The yards at Vladivostok–Dalzavod Voroshilov and Dalzavod No. 2–can build

and repair smaller warships and merchant vessels, tugs, and fishing boats. Smaller yards are situated at Nikolaev, Alexandrovsk, and Sovetsky Gavan, and a dozen or so more can be found along the river Amur. The total output is, however, less than 100,000 gross tons (self-propelled ships of all types).

The Arctic shipyards, where the first Russian vessels were built more than 250 years ago, declined between 1832 and 1932 almost completely, but even before the outbreak of World War II steps had been taken to set up new yards at Archangel, Murmansk, Molotovsk, and Kola. There are five yards in Archangel, two in Murmansk, and some smaller ones in other ports, partly engaged in repair work. Some of these have covered yards, enabling work to be carried on the whole year round. Archangel and Molotovsk are equipped for building warships and merchant vessels up to 15,000 gross tons, while Murmansk is said to be capable of constructing ships of 8,000 tons. In all, the total output of the Arctic yards is likely to be around 50,000 gross tons of self-propelled vessels.

The Caspian Sea has only small shipyards and repair yards. Construction of large ships, mostly tankers of 6,000, 9,000, and maybe 12,000 tons, goes on at yards along the Volga and other rivers, while the yards at Gorky, Kolomna, Perm, Shcherbakov, Stalingrad, Marks, Votkinsk, and Astrakhan, for example, are turning out not only river craft ranging from tugs and passenger vessels to large barges, but also seagoing ships of 4,500 to 12,000 tons. The total output of such yards may be as high as 100,000 tons of self-propelled craft per year, the bulk of which is launched along the Volga and its tributaries. All the other navigable rivers have their own, small shipbuilding yards, while many large shipyards are situated along the shores of the lakes, of which the most important are on lakes Ladoga, Onega, and Baikal. Some inland yards also produce landing craft, patrol boats, and small submarines.

The annual output of the Soviet shipbuilding industry, which has about one million workers, is in the region of 150,000 tons of warships, 150,000 tons of seagoing merchant ships, almost 100,000 tons of seagoing tugs, coasters, and fishing vessels, and another 100,000 tons of self-propelled river craft (tugs, barges, tankers, and passenger vessels). To this total of 500,000 tons must be added over 500,000 gross tons of barges, mainly of wooden construction. This production capacity is in the main sufficient to meet the needs of the Soviet Navy and merchant marine.

Since the end of World War II, over one million tons of warships have been built, as well as one million of seagoing merchant vessels, including about 500,000 tons of tankers. However, although the shipyards seem able to produce all the hulls required, from time to time difficulties are encountered as far as the provision of engines and other gear is concerned. Moreover, the repair yards seem utterly incapable of keeping up with the inflow of work, delays as much as three, five, or even eight years being encountered.

One of the advantages of Soviet shipbuilding is that costs do not have to be taken into consideration and as many as 50 or sometimes more ships of the same design are built simultaneously. Plans are prepared by a central shipbuilding

office and executed, with slight variations, by the shipyards. Ships are stoutly built (often for navigation in ice-covered waters) and of workmanlike appearance, but they have far fewer aids to navigation etc., than do the ships of other nations.

A valuable contribution to Soviet shipbuilding comes from the satellites. East Germany builds fishing vessels, river craft, tugs, and freighters of 3,000 and 10,000 gross tons, with a total output of almost 100,000 tons per year; the five Polish yards, some of which build ships of 10,000 gross tons, produce almost 150,000 tons per year; and Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia build tugs, trawlers, coasters, and merchant ships up to 3,000 gross tons. Their combined capacity is in the vicinity of 200,000 tons, most of which is absorbed by the Soviet Union. In addition, Finnish yards are working mostly on Soviet orders. In the near future the satellites will be in a position to launch about 500,000 gross tons of merchant ships per year, while warship construction in the Eastern bloc remains in the hands of the Soviets.

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The importance of tankers for the world economy in peacetime and for supply in war can hardly be overstressed. Indeed, the outcome of both world wars depended to an appreciable amount on ability to carry large quantities of oil to the theaters of war, while the ever increasing consumption of fuel for heating, transportation, and industrial uses in the civilian sector is also increasing the importance of tankers.

The first tankers, mostly carrying kerosene, appeared on the Atlantic during the second half of the nineteenth century. Shortly afterwards, Russia introduced some on the Caspian Sea, operated, however, by foreign groups (Nobel, Deterding) and mostly built abroad. These vessels were the first to install Diesel engines.

As for the Soviet tanker fleet today, three types must be distinguished:

1. River tankers, with loading capacities of several thousand tons, operating mostly on the Volga and the Amur, together with smaller vessels bringing to the industrial centers along the numerous Soviet inland waterways refined oil products.

2. Tankers on the Caspian Sea. The main sources of Soviet oil are still grouped around the shores of the Caspian, near Baku and Gurev, and most of the crude oil is transported from the wells to the Volga estuary by tanker, where it is transferred to ships with a shallower draught for transportation to the refineries on the Volga. In 1941, the Caspian tanker fleet had been estimated at 94 ships totaling 270,000 gross tons, of which over 50 had been built before the 1917 Revolution. The Soviet-built ones were mostly 6,000-ton Diesel-driven vessels with a speed of about 11 knots, but after the war the Diesel-electric General Asi Aslanov was commissioned, and some sister ships, allegedly displacing 9,000 tons, may also have been built. It has been claimed that ten or more tankers of 14,000 tons have been constructed since 1945. There are also numerous barges built to carry oil, but they operate only off the Volga estuary. To avoid having to transfer oil to shallow-draught barges off Astrakhan, some years ago several small tankers of

about 1,800 gross tons with a full-load draught of less than four meters were ordered. They could carry oil from Baku or Gurgev up the Volga to the refineries at Stalingrad and pass through the Lenin Canal into the Black Sea. At least six such vessels are known to be in service. In all, about 400,000 tons of tankers are available in the Caspian Sea, and the total is likely to be brought up to around 500,000 tons within a few years.

3. Seagoing and coastal tankers. When World War II started, Soviet Russia had about 30 tankers totaling approximately 130,000 gross tons and a few small naval oilers of maybe 10,000 tons. War losses, numbering at least 20 ships, were compensated by about a dozen American lend-lease tankers and over 20 former German, Italian, Dutch, and French tankers captured, seized, or refloated. Hence, by 1946 the Soviet tanker fleet had about 45 ships totaling 200,000 tons. It is almost certain that the Soviets continued the construction of three German tankers of 6,550 gross tons on the stocks at Varna, Bulgaria, and another of 3,000 tons under construction at Kherson, which fell into Russian hands in 1944.

The heavy damage done to the Soviet shipbuilding industry during the war and the fact that in the immediate postwar years building capacity was very limited caused the Soviets to try to order tankers from foreign yards. But owing to the political tension only two of 8,840 gross tons were delivered, one of which, the Tuapse, was captured in 1954 by Chinese Nationalist gunboats and now serves as a naval oiler at Formosa. Sweden, however, delivered in 1951–52 six Diesel-driven coastal tankers of 1,114 gross tons, while Finland, economically bound to the Soviet Union by the peace treaty and the subsequent trade agreements, between 1952 and 1958 built about 30 tankers, mostly of the 1,169-ton Diesel-driven type, but also including four of 4,000 tons (another four have been ordered) and some of 3,250 tons. The smaller coastal tankers built in Sweden and Finland are either attached to fishing fleets or serve outlying ports and settlements in the Arctic and Pacific, although a few act occasionally as naval tankers. The Irtysh, for example, one of the Swedish-built 1,114-ton tankers, was reported to be refueling four submarines off the Californian coast on March 15, 1958. East Germany provided some small tankers built in 1956–57, while 15 others of 247 gross tons are presently under construction. The former may be scheduled to work with fishing fleets, while the latter seem to be intended for the Black and Caspian seas. The Rosslau shipyard also produced a number of 580-ton tankers designed for refueling fishing vessels. However, as the satellites could build only coastal tankers and no more Soviet orders were accepted abroad, the USSR had to build the large tankers required by the country's steadily increasing industrial needs.

The Soviet shipyards had been repaired and in part improved by 1950, but the stepped-up naval construction program, involving cruisers, destroyers, escort vessels, and submarines, meant that almost all available slipways, manpower, and steel were being used to full capacity, so that the construction of tankers started in earnest a few years later.

The main type being built is the so-called Leningrad class, of which at least 50 have been commissioned since 1953. These tankers of 7,961 or 8,229 gross tons

have a length of 145.5 meters, a breadth of 19.2 meters, 2 Diesel engines with 4,000 hp and a speed of 12 knots, and a loading capacity of about 14,000 tons. Although dwarfed by the modern Western supertanker, they nevertheless boosted the Soviet tanker tonnage within a few years from less than 300,000 gross tons to almost 700,000. Some of these tankers were also employed to carry grain. The construction of this type of tanker seems to have reached its zenith, and two are now being built for East Germany, while other satellites have shown an interest in them. The Soviets are also offering Leningrad class tankers for sale in the West.

In the past few years a series of coastal tankers of about 1,500 gross tons, known as the Bolshevik Narimanov class, has been built. However, the general trend towards supertankers has led the Soviets to make a bid in this field too. Construction of a few tankers of about 16,000 gross tons was begun, mostly in Black Sea yards, and in 1956 the Krasnodar was launched at Nikolaev. One or two tankers of 37,000 tons are now on the stocks at Leningrad. They have a length of 201 meters, a breadth of 26 meters, steam-turbine engines of 19,000 hp, a speed of 17 knots, and a loading capacity of 25,000 tons of oil. They are intended for service between the Black Sea and the Far East. Tankers of 47,000 gross tons have been projected and there seems no reason why the Soviets should not be able to build such ships within a few years.

In all, 800,000 tons of seagoing tankers may now be available, while the final target of the Sixth Five-Year Plan is near the million-ton mark. Part of this tonnage will be assigned to the Soviet Navy for purely military use, but the remainder, at least four-fifths, would meet Soviet domestic needs as well as providing space for the export of oil. The satellites also have a few tankers. Bulgaria has two small coastal tankers of 280 gross tons; Romania has two (excluding numerous river tankers and oil-carrying barges), although plans have been made to purchase five Soviet Leningrad class tankers of 40,000 gross tons; East Germany has two Leningrad class tankers; Poland has two tankers of 4,000 gross tons built in Finland, one 1,500-ton tanker under construction, and another of 18,000 tons projected, two older small coastal tankers, and three medium-sized tankers bought abroad, while four tankers of 20,000 gross tons have been ordered from Yugoslavia. In addition, the Chinese have some coastal tankers and two Chinese-built ships of 3,700 and 4,500 gross tons respectively. None of the Communist-bloc countries has sufficient tankers to meet its own needs, but steps to improve this situation have already been taken and a total of about 200,000 gross tons is likely to be reached in the near future.

In conclusion, the great efforts made by the Soviets to build up their tanker fleet have produced the desired effect: the country's economy will profit from the increased tanker tonnage, consumption and industrial production are likely to be increased, and oil exports stepped up. A strong tanker fleet would even enable the Soviets to make deals with the oil-producing countries of the Near and Middle East. Last but not least, the mobility of the Soviet Navy has been much increased by the addition of modern tankers, almost completely lacking prior to 1950.

J. Meister

International Communism

Soviet Economic Integration Plans for the Communist Bloc

On June 26–30, 1958, the Soviet-bloc Council for Mutual Economic Aid held its ninth session in Bucharest. This event aroused little comment in the non-Communist world, despite the fact that the session of June 18–25, 1957 in Warsaw had made decisions of considerable economic and political import. As deputy chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations P. Nikitin put it:

> At present in accordance with the decisions of the eighth session of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid the countries participating on the Council have set about preparing the materials for the compilation of long-range economic plans for 1959–65 and the main lines for economic development down to 1975. Further . . . specialization and extended cooperation . . . are envisaged.[1]

At the end of September 1957, the chairmen of the planning organs of the countries on the Council had discussed a joint fifteen-year economic plan (1960–75) in Prague. It was agreed that the individual countries should draw up their own economic plans which would then be coordinated at international levels.[2] Reports reaching the West on the talks between the various delegations of specialists and the decisions of the Bucharest session indicate clearly enough that the Council has set about the practical measures necessary for the economic integration of the Soviet-bloc states. However, not only is Soviet economic development to be closely linked with that of the satellites, the fifteen-year plan is pursuing other, equally important aims.

The Council was founded on January 25, 1949 in Moscow and appeared at first to be a rather innocuous body. The communiqué justifying its creation pointed out that the Marshall Plan had led to an economic boycott of the USSR and the East European states which were unwilling to submit to its dictatorship. Accordingly, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR had thus decided to form the Council, whose aim would be the exchange of economic information, mutual aid in technical matters, and the exchange of raw materials, foodstuffs, machinery, and equipment.[3] Such a step appeared to be more of a demonstrative than practical nature, since the opinion was widespread that Moscow rigidly controlled the satellite economies. Here, one detail was overlooked: The creation of the Council meant that the leading role of the Soviet Union was no longer of paramount importance. The Communist-bloc countries were aiming at the removal of national boundaries, at least in the economic field.

The communiqués on the first sessions of the Council were very brief. The one on the results of the second conference on August 27, 1949, held in Sofia, re-

[1] *Izvestia*, January 16, 1958.

[2] *Nepszabadsag*, Budapest, January 4, 1958.

[3] B. Meissner: *Das Ostpakt-System: Dokumente*. Herausgegeben von der Forschungsstelle für Völkerrecht und ausländisches öffentliches Recht der Universität Hamburg, Frankfurt am Main—Berlin, 1955, pp. 108—109.

stricted itself to the remark that the council had discussed current work problems and taken the necessary decisions.[4] Then came an apparent standstill which lasted until 1954. Nevertheless, in spite of signs to the contrary, economic integration among the Soviet-bloc countries continued unabated over this period. The following table shows the percentage of trade done by some Communist-bloc states with the Communist bloc as a whole during the period 1949–53:

	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953		1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
Poland	43.0	59.0	58.0	67.0	70.4	Bulgaria	82.0	88.0	92.0	89.0	85.7
Czechoslovakia ..	45.0	52.0	60.0	71.0	78.4	Albania	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Hungary	46.0	61.0	67.0	71.0	77.0	East Germany ..	—	65.2	75.0	74.0	76.4
Romania	82.0	83.0	79.0	85.0	84.4	China	—	26.0	61.0	72.0	—

SOURCE: *Osteuropa-Wirtschaft*, Stuttgart, No. 1 (1956), p. 3.

The Soviet Union, of course, took much of the satellites' trade; in 1952 it accounted for 58% of Romania's foreign trade, 57% of Bulgaria's, 48% of East Germany's, 35% of Czechoslovakia's, 32% of Poland's, 29% of Hungary's, and 54% of China's. The Soviet Union did 80% of its foreign trade with the Communist bloc in 1952, while Outer Mongolia, Albania, and North Korea traded exclusively with Communist countries.[5]

In this period economic development was not accompanied by the reorganization and integration of the individual countries' economies. The only essential change in the satellites' economic structure was the emphasis on heavy industry.

From 1953 onwards, however, voices began to be heard in Eastern Europe demanding a better division of labor among the Communist-bloc countries. Then Czech foreign minister Dvorak wrote in the Kominform newspaper *Za prochny mir, za narodnuyu demokratiyu* that changes from the second half of 1953 would lead to increased coordination of economic plans and output, while a rapid increase in the standard of living of the "people's democracies," more careful planning of new capital investments, and the more careful use of existing production capacities would remove any tendencies toward economic autarky.[6] Such ideas were by no means new, but in the period 1954–56 they began to acquire ever-increasing practical importance. References to an increased standard of living began to appear more regularly in official communiqués; the slogan "coordination" led in the summer of 1957 to the proclamation of the fifteen-year plan. It would appear at first glance that this coordination and division of labor were aimed at increasing the standard of living of the Communist-bloc peoples.

The Council conferences of March 26–27, 1954 in Moscow, of August 1954 in Budapest, and of June 1955 in Warsaw gave a good idea of the lines to be taken. Besides heavy industry, the individual Communist states were to concentrate, within the framework of the "international socialist division of labor," on those branches of industry which best suited them. Poland, for example, was to manufacture medium tractors, Hungary to help Czechoslovakia to build an aluminum plant, and the latter to deliver equipment to the former for bauxite processing

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 109.

[5] G. Kohlmey, *Der demokratische Weltmarkt*, Berlin, 1955, pp. 229–30.

[6] *Za prochny mir, za narodnuyu demokratiyu*, Bucharest, February 12, 1954.

works. On the other hand, Bulgaria was not to build up its own tractor and automobile industry. It was further reported that the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and East Germany had regulated by treaty various types of rolling-mill products and come to an agreement on the joint manufacture and distribution of ball bearings.[7]

The Berlin conference of May 18–25, 1956 was convened with the express purpose of implementing Moscow's plans for the economic integration of the Communist-bloc states. The official communiqué stated that

> at the Council session problems of coordinating the development of important branches of the national economy of the countries participating for the years 1955 to 1960 were discussed, that is, machine building, precision and optical instrument manufacture, ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, the coal, petroleum, and gas industries, the chemical industry, light industry, and agriculture. The session of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid accepted recommendations agreed on between the countries concerned as to the amount of production and mutual deliveries of the most important machinery, equipment, raw materials, fuel, and foodstuffs.[8]

The East German newspaper *Neues Deutschland* added that the manufacture of over 600 machine-building industry products had been divided among the countries specializing in this particular branch of industry.[9] Accordingly, all other countries were to cease manufacturing these goods.

By the middle of 1956, all the people's democracies, with the exception of Bulgaria, had announced their five-year plans, which had been coordinated with each other and with the Soviet plan. Integration and division of labor were particularly noticeable in the machine-building and metallurgical industries. A similar integration had been planned in the steel and iron industries with the aim of stepping up iron ore output to 68.3 millions tons, steel production to 90.4 million, and the manufacture of rolling-mill products to 68.6 million tons by 1960. If 1955, the year immediately preceding the Polish and Hungarian events, which had such serious economic consequences for the Soviet Union and the satellites, is taken by way of example, the following picture of Soviet-bloc trade is obtained:

Breakdown of Soviet-Bloc Trade in 1955

Percentage of Trade with	USSR	Poland	Hungary	Czechoslovakia	East Germany	Romania	Bulgaria
USSR	—	32.2	22.0	33.7	40.0	47.0	46.2
Poland	9.7	—	5.1	6.7	10.1	2.6	4.0
Hungary	4.0	3.1	—	5.6	5.1	5.1	4.3
Czechoslovakia	12.1	8.4	11.8	—	6.1	12.8	11.6
East Germany	16.1	13.4	10.0	6.7	—	7.7	13.1
Romania	7.3	1.3	3.3	4.5	3.0	—	4.6
Bulgaria	2.8	0.9	1.7	2.2	2.0	2.1	—
China, Albania, North Korea, Outer Mongolia	6.6	3.8	5.7	10.1	8.1	2.1	3.5

SOURCE: *Hinter dem Eisernen Vorhang*, Munich, No. 5 (1957), pp. 5–6.

[7] *Osteuropa-Wirtschaft*, Stuttgart, No. 1 (1956), p. 6.
[8] *Neues Deutschland*, Berlin, May 30, 1956.
[9] *Ibid.*

The two states expected to play the major role in economic integration are naturally Czechoslovakia and East Germany, the two most highly industrialized satellites. In 1956, Poland and Hungary were to play important roles–the former with its coal, the latter with its bauxite, uranium, and industry. Increased Hungarian economic participation in the Council for Mutual Economic Aid would make independence from Moscow more difficult. Demands were heard during the Hungarian Revolution which were clearly directed against the Council. On October 28, 1956, the Revolutionary Committee stated that

> the government should abrogate all foreign trade agreements which are disadvantageous to this country. It should make public all foreign trade agreements concluded in the past, including those relating to uranium ore and bauxite.[10]

The revolutionaries were evidently opposed to Soviet monopoly over Hungarian uranium and bauxite. Until October 1956, the Hungarian uranium mines were under complete Soviet control; Hungarian atomic scientist Janosi stated that "Hungarian experts were left in the dark. For instance, I, as Vice-Chairman of the Atomic Energy Comittee, was not informed about the existence of uranium."[11]

The Polish and Hungarian events of October 1956 threatened Moscow's plans for economic integration. The serious setback suffered obviously compelled the Kremlin to reorganize economic relations with the European satellites. This process took place not within the framework of the Council, but by direct bilateral agreements between the USSR and the individual satellite countries. A major point was revision of import-export prices between the USSR and the satellites. Poland came off best from the new prices; the price paid by the Soviets for Polish coal had been one of the reasons for the Warsaw disturbances in October 1956. Gomulka succeeded in having Polish debts amounting to 2.1 billion rubles annulled. Simultaneously, Poland was granted credit to the value of 700 million rubles and grain worth 400 million rubles.[12] Hungary also received important concessions–at least the removal of certain abuses was pompously proclaimed. The joint Soviet-Hungarian declaration signed in Moscow stated that in the future Hungary would sell its uranium to Moscow at a just and mutually agreed price.[13]

Such economic aid, granted either by the Soviet Union or by the individual satellite states to each other, was not merely intended as a means of bridging over temporary economic failures; it was rather a form of economic credit, designed to make the satellites more dependent on Moscow and one another. Such credits were obviously more in the nature of capital investments. East Germany, for example, received, on the basis of talks held January 3–8, 1957 in Moscow, credit to the value of 340 million rubles in convertible currency in order to buy raw material which the USSR could not supply from the West.[14] In March 1957, Moscow granted Hungary economic aid in the form of credit to the value of 875 million

[10] *Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary*, New York, 1957, p. 77, Annex G.
[11] *The Revolt in Hungary*, New York, 1957, p. 64.
[12] *TASS*, November 18, 1956.
[13] *Nepszabadsag*, March 29, 1957.
[14] *TASS*, January 7, 1957.

rubles[15] and in December 1957 further credit of 300 million rubles.[16] Hungarian Minister Antal Apro made it clear that these credits were intended as capital investments, to step up the development of those branches of Hungarian industry manufacturing exports for the Near East.[17]

During the second half of this period of bilateral economic agreements between Moscow and the satellites the former embarked on its new multilateral plan–the fifteen-year plan for the Soviet Union and the European satellites–at the Warsaw session of June 18–25, 1957. In the West the topics for discussion at the conference were seen as the unsatisfactory supply of coal, coke, oil, and ores to the heavy and consumer goods industries and the problem of supplying East Germany and Czechoslovakia with Polish coal.[18] However, the fifteen-year plan is not just another economic plan. It aims at turning the USSR and the satellites into a single economic unit, thus making national boundaries politically and militarily unnecessary. The Council for Mutual Economic Aid is an economic organ intended to implement Moscow's policies on the international level. This fact became obvious six days after the creation of the Council in 1949 when Yugoslavia sent a note to Moscow expressing surprise at not being invited to the inaugural ceremony.[19] From the very beginning the Council was intended as a "weapon of socialism"; Stalin's death, "liberalization," "the peace offensive," Khrushchev's climb to power and his reforms–decentralization of Soviet industry and nationalization of the kolkhozes–have not effected the Council. Quite the reverse. The originally planned role of the Council is now coming more and more to the fore. For years reports in the satellite press on the Council were few and far between. The introduction of the fifteen-year plan leads to the conclusion that the Council is possibly–by different means, of course–to assume the role of the former Comintern.

For several months now there have been frequent commentaries of a propaganda nature on the Council and acknowledgment of its program has become one of the obligatory slogans for Soviet-bloc statesmen. On April 3, 1958, Khrushchev and Kadar pledged themselves to mutual economic aid in Budapest;[20] in June, Czech Party First Secretary Antonin Novotny glorified the Council's work at the Eleventh Czech Party Congress;[21] and a Hungarian-Bulgarian joint declaration of June 27, 1958 stressed the Council's work.[22] An article in the Hungarian Party organ *Nepszabadsag* of June 26, 1958 stated:

> To no purpose did the Seventh Congress of the Union of Yugoslav Communists regret that the "division of the world into blocs entailed just such a splitting of the world's economy instead of economic integration and thus caused enormous harm

[15] *Nepszabadsag, op. cit.*
[16] *Ibid.*, December 25, 1957.
[17] *Ibid.*
[18] *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Zurich, June 26, 1957.
[19] B. Meissner, *op. cit.*
[20] *Nepszabadsag*, April 4, 1958.
[21] *Aufbau und Frieden*, Prague, June 19, 1958.
[22] *Nepszabadsag*, June 29, 1958.

to peoples." The creation of the socialist camp, the stepping up of the economic cooperation of the countries of this camp entails enormous advantages, above all for the peoples of the socialist camp, but also for everybody outside [its] borders . . . who desires peace and socialism.

Today, it is, for tactical reasons, inexpedient for the Communists to stress the general ideological struggle. Not only has Communism suffered severe setbacks since 1948 in Yugoslavia, East Germany, Poland, and Hungary, but too great an emphasis of the ideological struggle would harm Moscow's peace policy. The Council for Mutual Economic Aid is a much better weapon. As Czech Party First Secretary Novotny put it: "The decisive battle for the realization of socialism must be fought in the economic sphere."[23]

The fifteen-year plan automatically disproves the view that the Soviets are not intent on maintaining the *status quo*, but might be persuaded, at a summit conference, for example, to free some of the satellites. The plan entails the final incorporation of the satellites into the Soviet empire, while the division of labor is gradually creating a situation in which the economic independence of these countries is being reduced from year to year so that they will eventually be able to survive only within the Eastern bloc.

Moscow's policy of economic integration coincides with official statements by Soviet statesmen on the fate of the satellites (except for East Germany). Moscow leaves no doubt as to the fact that the creation of the so-called people's democracies is a development which cannot be reversed. The fifteen-year plan demonstrates the Kremlin's seriousness in this matter. It does, however, to some extent contradict Moscow's attitude to German reunification. Numerous Soviet declarations have stressed that reunification is the affair of the two German states presently in existence, and can only be achieved by negotiations between East and West Germany.[24] At the same time the Kremlin is going ahead with an economic plan aimed at linking East Germany with Eastern Europe. East German participation in the plan and the propagation of a temporary federation of the two German states as a way to reunification show that Moscow has not given up hopes of annexing West Germany. First Secretary of the East German Socialist United Party (SED) Walter Ulbricht made this point rather clear in his interview with the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* when he replied in answer to the question as to how long the period of confederation would last prior to actual reunification, "that depends above all on the working class and their organizations."[25]

The fifteen-year plan has become an integral part of Soviet policy and there are daily promises of economic successes in the Soviet Union and the socialist camp. Khrushchev stated in Budapest on April 3, 1958 that "the Soviet people is sure that our country will in the immediate future not only catch up but also overtake the United States in the economic field."[26] The task, however, is not an easy

[23] *Ibid.*, June 19, 1958.
[24] *Pravda*, September 9, 1957.
[25] *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Munich, February 15-16, 1958.
[26] *Nepszabadsag*, April 4, 1958.

one, in spite of forced industrialization. Even Communist sources admit that in 1956 American per capita output was considerably in advance of that of the USSR: electric power, 320%; coal, 50%; petroleum, 400%; iron ore, 130%; steel, 160%; cement, 160%; woolen cloth, 30%; footwear, 140%. The Communist counter to such figures is to quote the following index of industrial output of the USSR, the USA, and the most highly industrialized West European states (1913=100):[27]

	1929	1938	1956
Soviet Union	158	657	3,018
United States	167	136	402
Great Britain	98	113	148
France	139	105	185
West Germany	102	124	223

It would, however, appear that Soviet industrial output has reached its maximum potentialities with the present resources of material and manpower. Output of steel is the backbone of any program of industrialization and in 1956, the Soviets planned to increase overall steel output of the Council countries to 90.4 million tons by 1960. Soviet steel output for 1957 was 51 million tons,[28] and the combined figure for the European satellites 16 million tons.[29] On May 29, 1958, *Radio Prague* gave a total figure of 68 million tons. However, if, which appears highly unlikely, the figure of 90.4 million tons is reached by 1960, the Soviet bloc will still be far behind Western steel production. Western Europe–including one million tons from Yugoslavia–had in 1957 a combined total of 90.5 million tons, while the United States alone produced 102 million tons.[30]

Moscow apparently feels itself compelled to take some measures to improve the Soviet citizen's standard of living. On November 6, 1957, Khrushchev inaugurated a campaign to overtake American per capita output of meat, milk, and butter in the near future.[31] In January 1958, Moscow announced that the Soviet Union would overtake American per capita output of milk in 1958.[32] Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations P. Nikitin linked this task with the work of the Council, basing himself on a quotation from a speech by Khrushchev:

> This task–as N. S. Khrushchev pointed out–will be solved much quicker if economic cooperation among the socialist countries is consolidated and perfected on the basis of the rational division of labor, cooperation in production, and the coordination of plans for their economic development.[33]

The Council for Mutual Economic Aid is also a vehicle for Soviet expansion, as embodied in the economic aid to the so-called neutral countries. The planned coordination and division of labor should considerably step up this policy of

[27] *Ibid.*, September 29, 1957.
[28] *Pravda*, November 7, 1957.
[29] *Nepszabadsag*, April 6, 1958.
[30] *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, Bonn, No. 51 (1958), p. 466.
[31] *Pravda*, November 7, 1957.
[32] *TASS*, January 21, 1958.
[33] *Izvestia*, *op. cit.*

expansion. One such example is the factory equipment to be delivered by the USSR to the United Arab Republic, much of which is being manufactured by Hungary. Moscow, therefore, gains political influence by granting favorable credit in the form of goods, the cost of which is partially borne by the satellites. The Council for Mutual Economic Aid is thus not merely a defensive measure against the West, but an active weapon in Moscow's policy of expansion by every means possible.

Stefan C. Stolte

Literature and Arts

The Young Generation of Soviet Writers

The character and trends of the creative work being produced by Soviet youth is of particular significance inasmuch as it is the key to the spiritual outlook and general behavior of the younger Soviet generation. As is known, one of the most pressing problems now facing the Soviet leaders is the attitude of the youth of the country and much attention is being given to it. Crises, particularly of an economic nature–in industry or agriculture, for example–are a commonplace in the Soviet Union, and as soon as one is over, another takes its place. But if, say, the creation of the sovnarkhozes or the reorganization of the MTS do not produce the desired results, other experiments, whether on similar or completely different lines, can always be made, in the hope that the ultimate goal will eventually be achieved; either way, no absolutely irreparable damage to the regime is likely to be done. Ideological crises, however, are a different matter; if they are not solved with complete success, the whole foundation of the Soviet structure is undermined. This is particularly true in the case of the youth, for from the younger generation of today come the leaders of tomorrow.

Thus, the present ideological crisis now so evident among Soviet youth is rightly being regarded by the authorities as a top-priority problem. Under Soviet conditions, the very fact that the press is writing so much on the topic is an indication of its gravity. On June 15, 1958, *Pravda* contained a lead article entitled "An Important Task of Our Society" in which this disquietude was clearly discernible. After the usual beginning, stressing how much better off Communist youth is than its non-Communist counterpart–"The Communist Party is carrying out enormous work on educating the new man. . ., capitalism is maiming people, disfiguring them spiritually, and crushing their sense of dignity"–the admission is made that "this does not mean that we have already put an end to the remnants of the past, the old views and habits, inherited from capitalism." This statement heralded a veritable diatribe against "amoral" actions by individual members of the younger generation. "Among young people there are those who lead a lazy way of life, have a careless attitude towards physical labor, and pay homage to the tinsel of the capitalist world."

Then again on April 18, 1958 Khrushchev stated at the Thirteenth Komsomol Congress that

in some places the organization of a youth meeting begins with a call to the police: "Send a policeman, we want to hold a youth meeting. . ." "Why a policeman?" "What do you mean, why? To calm [them] down. . ." Do we really have in Communism hooligans and policemen to calm them down?[1]

True, these are primarily attacks on the ethics of Soviet youth; but accusations of a political nature are equally common. Thus, *Komsomolskaya pravda* published an article on April 13, 1958 by head of the students' department of the Komsomol Central Committee A. Tarasov, entitled "Kazan–A Students' City." Tarasov complained that "the [student] members of the [Komsomol] bureau of the university's chemical faculty, having decided that Komsomol work hampers their studies, demanded that they be replaced before the expiration of their term of office."

Indeed, the whole tone of most of the statements in the Soviet press on the subject imply that the problem is primarily political. The talk of hooliganism, drunkenness, debauchery, and the like naturally raises the question of the reason for such outbursts. Here, the Soviet press does not, or rather cannot give the right answer, but literature is not bound quite so rigidly by the Party as is the press and here, especially among the younger authors, the mood of youth can be traced with reasonable accuracy.

However, before turning to the younger Soviet writers it is worth noting what such a well-established writer as A. Korneichuk has to say on the subject. In his latest play *Why the Stars Smiled* one of the characters, a young student, says:

> You are living in the past, but I live for the future. Perhaps the Komsomol was once a gay, interesting organization, but now it is such a bore. It only hinders us poets with its copybook truths. . .[2]

His mother too speaks in a similar vein and mentions the fact that a young girl of her acquaintance had left the Komsomol, although her father still worked in the oblast committee. Korneichuk shows in a number of dialogues how many young persons constantly dream of the free world, of Paris, Stockholm, Italy, and other places with a vastly different way of life. Of course, the tried and trusted Communist Korneichuk is not trying to present such views in a favorable light. Quite the reverse; he caricatures them and condemns them, but that is not the point. What really matters is that he is willingly acknowledging the existence of such features as something widespread.

However, the sincere thoughts and feelings with which many of the works of the younger authors are imbued reveal more on the essence of the problem than the propaganda attacks of the Korneichuks. In this respect, the most outstanding is the young 25-year old poet Evgeny Evtushenko, who in almost every verse expresses his protest against the system and against an ideology which in the Soviet Union has the force of law. In the well-known speech he made on literature Khrushchev even mentioned him by name, expressing the hope that Evtushenko would "pay some attention to Party criticism." However, the writer

[1] *Pravda*, April 19, 1958.
[2] *Znamya*, No. 1 (1958).

refused to join the Komsomol, and he may be taken as best characterizing the moods of the Soviet young generation. His freshness and unwillingness to make himself a servant are two of the most striking features of his verse.

Typical of his work is his collection of poems entitled *Promise*[3] which was published at the beginning of 1958 although first set up in type early in 1957. The title indicates the poet's promise to remain true to himself irrespective of the demands made on him by the Party leaders.

The symposium begins with the poem *Prologue*, in which the poet expresses his credo: "Long live movement / and fervor / and longing / triumphant longing! / Boundaries hinder me . . . / I do not like / not knowing Buenos Aires, New York / I want to roam about / as much as I like / in London, / talk to everybody / even in broken English. / Like a boy / hanging out of the omnibus / I want to travel through Paris in the morning, / I want art, but different–like myself!" (p. 6).

Indicative of the man is his attitude to those persons rarely mentioned in the press–the thousands who have returned from the concentration camps. In a poem dedicated to one of the returnees, he wrote: "He eagerly listens to the radio, / follows the press, / everything in him breathes character / buzzes with interest . . ." (p. 21).

It is not without reason that in the final line of this poem he adds that he himself is afraid of nothing.

Evtushenko's negative attitude toward the existing system is brought to the fore in a short poem about a boy with an apple in his hand who catches each breath of life and who is destined for great things in the future. The poet is clearly speaking of the new generation which wants to build life in a new way, not at all according to Party directives. He foresees a dreadful clash between this young generation and its predecessors: "But I tremble before the moment / when, having understood his rights, / he will rise / recognized / above the world / and will speak new words" (p. 36).

In a sharp attack on the representatives of the regime, whom he regards as personal enemies, he wrote: "Many do not like me / blaming me for many things / and cast thunder and lightning / at me. / Sullen and strained they laugh at me / and I feel their unkind glances on my back. / But I like all this / I am proud that they cannot cope with me / and can do nothing about me" (p. 25).

On another occasion he attacks them even more determinedly, calling them false friends who use praise and gifts to gain their aims, but hold a knife beneath their coat. Therefore, he advises all those being tempted with bribes: "Let malice sit in your heart. / Let them condemn you, upbraid you / but do not let them buy you with honors / seduce you with luxury" (p. 42).

Many of Evtushenko's poems are a call to revolt or a revolt in themselves, and it was inevitable that official Soviet criticism would turn its attention to him. Long after the violent attacks made on Party orders in 1957 on free-thinking

[3] E. Evtushenko, *Obeshchanie* (Promise), Moscow, 1957.

writers and artists in general, *Literaturnaya gazeta* published an article by V. Soloukhin entitled "Without a Clear Standpoint," which was an analysis of Evtushenko's *Promise*. Soloukhin asserted that the poems were seditious and had an inherent offensive, militant tone.[4]

The accusations did not stop here. On July 12, 1958, *Literaturnaya gazeta*, in a special section entitled "Pre-Congress Tribune," attacked Evtushenko in an article by A. Demshits:

> This small volume [*Promise*] has already been subjected by the press to serious and competent criticism. But. . . we should have gone beyond its limits and turned our thoughts to those whose moods the poet was endeavoring to express in a number of his verses. Then it would have become clear that Evtushenko is by no means alone in his moods, that he is spiritually linked with a small, but rather unpleasant stratum of egoistically inclined youth, which thinks not so much about giving to society as taking from it.[5]

The poem "Prologue" is analyzed in great detail and Evtushenko is compared with Igor Severyanin. The critic attacks the young poet for placing in the center of many of his works a type of personality which is unacceptable to socialist society because of its "many unpleasant features." Evtushenko is accused of decadence, an individualistic approach to the world, and the glorification of what, from the Communist standpoint, are negative features of man: "Indeed, such verses of Evtushenko as the 'Prologue' and the like deserve not simply a critical analysis but a fiery . . . rebuff, the angry, cutting word." Then again, secretary general of the Union of Soviet Writers A. Surkov admitted in his speech at the Thirteenth Komsomol Congress that Evtushenko was a capable poet, but he added the warning that he should let his art develop and not "vacillate" too much.[6]

Surkov was also disturbed by the fact that very few representatives of the younger generation are taking up literature. It should be borne in mind that although after the October 1917 Revolution not all the younger generation welcomed the new regime, many young writers, poets, artists, and so on began to increase both the volume and quality of their work. In the period 1918–24, Fadeev, Svetlov, Golodny, Utkin, Kataev, Bezymensky, Ilf, Petrov, Bagritsky, and Olesha, to name but a few, began to make a reputation for themselves in literary circles. Indeed, the younger generation founded its own literary circles, which began to compete on equal terms with those of the recognized writers. True, many of them were later subjected to repressive measures or gave up writing, but that is not the point. The important thing is that they appeared. A section of the youth was genuinely carried away by the romantic side of the revolution. Then, however, came the decline, the roots of which were very deep. Not least was the inexorable crushing of the illusions of the present younger generation during the past twenty years; the revolutionary romanticism has not simply lost its real meaning, it has actually turned against itself.

[4] *Literaturnaya gazeta*, April 8, 1958.
[5] *Ibid.*, July 12, 1958.
[6] *Komsomolskaya pravda*, April 20, 1958.

The Communist leaders could not but notice this process. In an "Open Letter of an Old Komsomol Member to Young Writers" by Nikolai Bogdanov, in *Komsomolskaya pravda* on April 11, 1958, the writer stated that "the young writers of our generation and of the one that followed attempted to extract from the diversity of life the new, positive, progressive features the Revolution was bringing to mankind."[7] But he then went on to compare these earlier days with the present, and he lamented the fact that the former romanticism had been spent, leaving no trace, because the younger writers are incapable of feeling the pulse of life.

This statement provides the key to what Surkov had in mind when he said there were few young writers. But Evtushenko is by no means alone, for there are such talented youths as Robert Rozhdestvensky, Eduard Shim (one of whose collections of tales was suppressed last year), and Nikolai Ageev (one of whose poems "Lights on the Chusovaya," in which the main character, a peasant who had fought during the Civil War against Kolchak, dreams of his own farm, was reviewed in the first 1958 issue of *Znamya*).

What Surkov really wanted to say was that in recent years there have been almost no young writers who have completely fitted in with the Party's requirements. In this respect he was correct: the shortage is indeed striking, for Evtushenko, Rozhdestvensky, Shim, and the others do not rush to depict the themes demanded of them by the regime–at least not from the point of view desired by the authorities. Thus, although Ageev writes about farming, it is from the point of view of one who still dreams of having land of his own.

The disappearance of revolutionary romanticism and, in particular, the romanticism of the Komsomol, has been accompanied by an increase in the reluctance of present-day youth to follow in their fathers' footsteps. This is more than just the usual clash of views between one generation and another; it is a heroic protest by the youth against legalized falsehood, against lack of freedom, and against physical and spiritual oppression. However, it must not be considered that the older generation is on the side of the system; the truth is rather that the older generation has been crushed by Communist tyranny and with few exceptions is too afraid to do anything.

Since it is impossible to combat an ideological crisis with directives only, the Party leaders have been trying for the last year and a half to remedy the situation by creating cadres of young writers willing to fulfill the Party's demands. This is being done by numerous seminars which are organized in almost all the more important centers throughout the country. However, success seems to be just as far away as ever, for there are no signs that the ideological crisis is being overcome. Most important, the standard-bearers of the present "revolt" are the youth of the country who, even after being subjected to severe measures to bring them in line, are refusing to lay down their arms. *A. Gaev*

[7] *Ibid.*, April 11, 1958.

REVIEWS

Kommunist

Organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Published by PRAVDA. No. 10, 1958

Issue No. 10 of the Party theoretical organ *Kommunist* begins with an article entitled "End Anglo-American Aggression, Defend the Cause of Peace," in essence a résumé of numerous other articles on the situation in the Near and Middle East. Great play is made of the usual hackneyed concepts, such as "imperialism," "nationalism," "aggressive actions," and attacks on the Western states alternate with praise of Soviet policy and statements by Khrushchev.

D. Kaidalov's "The Building of Communism and the Problem of the All-round Development of Man in Labor" appears at first glance to deal with purely theoretical problems. However, the article is concerned with extremely pressing practical questions. The point is that the recent reform of the Soviet educational system with its emphasis on polytechnical training is not proceeding as well as the Party leaders had originally hoped. Speaking of the introduction of polytechnical training into the secondary school, the author states that

> the education organs have not yet succeeded in achieving significant successes in this direction. . . . An analysis of the existing curriculums shows that to date schools have concentrated all their [efforts] on the mental development of the children, striving to communicate to them as much knowledge as possible in general educational disciplines, to prepare them for entrance to the higher educational establishments, and pushing into the background, as something subsidiary, care for physical development and polytechnical training.

Evidently, the Party leaders are endeavoring to find a theoretical justification for such polytechnical training in schools and to create the impression that all-round development of man is best begun when he is still a child. Hence, a child ought to do socially productive labor, and several interesting examples are quoted by way of illustration: In Stavropol Krai brigades of schoolchildren help with the harvest or work on livestock raising farms; in the Ukraine some schoolchildren actually learn a specialty at industrial enterprises.

In other words, Communist theory has proved in practice to be nothing more or less than the exploitation of child labor. The article deliberately concentrates on the positive side of the matter: the children learn respect for physical labor and acquire practical knowledge which will be of use to them later.

The campaign against manifestations of revisionism and reformism is continued in K. Momdzhyan's "A Powerful Weapon in the Struggle for Revolutionary Marxism," written to mark the eightieth anniversary of the publication of Engels' work *Anti-Dühring*. Of considerable interest is the fact that the writer's polemics with Western scholars in the field of dialectical and historical materialism give a good idea of the questions presently under examination. They are: (1) Do changes

in the capitalist system affect its very essence–capitalist property and bourgeois production relations? (2) Have classes with their antagonistic contradictions disappeared from bourgeois society? (3) Has the fundamental contradiction of capitalism between the social nature of production and the private nature of ownership ceased to exist? (4) Has the bourgeois state turned into a neutral supraclass force?

The answer to any one of these questions will make the Soviet approach clear. Replying to the question as to the changes which have taken place in the capitalist system over the last eighty years, the writer substantiates his remarks with quotations from Engels' work, thus coming to the conclusion that the analysis of capitalist society and prophecies as to its inevitable historical fate given by Marx and Engels are still valid today.

Y. Maksarev's "Complex Mechanization and Automation–The Main Line in Technological Progress" examines problems of automatic and remote control as they affect the Soviet Union. The usual list of supposed Soviet successes in this field is given. The claim is made that in all regional hydroelectric power stations all stages of production are carried out by automation, which is now being introduced into thermal power stations, and that even remote control has been introduced into a number of enterprises.

Later on in the article, however, it turns out that automation has to date only been introduced into those enterprises where no particular difficulties were likely to have been encountered, mainly in the electric power industry. The picture is rather different in the machine-building industry where the Soviets have come up against considerable difficulties, as a result of which they are lagging behind the US in some respects.

The State Scientific and Technical Committee has finally worked out plans for the development of technology in the USSR over the period 1959–65, including the introduction of automative processes into plants and factories by way of experiment prior to converting whole branches of industry. Emphasis is laid on future development since Soviet achievements to date will not bear comparison with those of the West. Nevertheless, two important things have been overlooked: First, the West will not be marking time during the Soviet seven-year plan, and second, automation leads to the problem of manpower surpluses.

References to the artificial earth satellite and atomic power stations are hardly to the point. The Soviet answer at present is that in the capitalist world automation is directed against the workers, while in the Soviet Union it serves the worker and leads to a plethora of consumer goods.

An article by Secretary of the Stavropol Krai Committee I. Lebedev entitled "New Features on the Kolkhozes and Party Work in the Countryside" describes in glowing colors the changes which have supposedly taken place in Stavropol Krai since the reorganization of the machine tractor stations, the transfer of their machinery to the kolkhozes, and the introduction of the new regulations for the delivery of agricultural produce. Significantly enough no details are given as to the conditions for sale; the writer restricts himself to the profits made, not by the

kolkhozniks, but by the state. However, some figures do slip in: the Stavropol Krai kolkhozes received from the machine tractor stations 6,039 tractors, 3,837 combine harvesters, and 82,000 other agricultural machines, costing a total of 254,500,000 rubles. Each kolkhoz received an average of almost 1,500,000 rubles worth of agricultural machinery.

There is no doubt that the state has come out of the deal well. It has obtained, in addition to the money received earlier for the hire of the machines, 254,500,000 rubles. In other words, the machinery has paid for itself many times over. Further, the periods of purchase are as short as possible; two thirds of this sum is to be paid off in 1958 and the rest in 1959. Moreover, the kolkhozes now have to pay the tractor drivers, machine operators, engineers, agronomists, and other personnel, earlier paid by the machine tractor stations. There are about 20,500 such persons in Stavropol Krai alone, representing an extra burden of several million rubles. By August 10, 1958, the krai had to meet its plan for grain deliveries under the new regulations, a total all in all of about 1,500,000 metric tons. In order to ensure that the grain was delivered the number of Party members on the kolkhozes was increased, from 7,570 in May to 9,746 in June.

The remainder of this issue of *Kommunist* contains the complete text of the report read by First Secretary of the East German Socialist United Party (SED) Walter Ulbricht at the Fifth Party Congress in Berlin. *E. Kovalenko*

CHRONICLE OF EVENTS

(As reported by the Soviet Press and Radio)

August 1958

1 Mikoyan has talk with Adlai Stevenson.

Report published of seminar in Moscow of heads of lecture groups of the union republic central committees, krai and oblast committees.

Telegram of Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace and Soviet Committee for Solidarity with the Afro-Asian Countries to Hammarskjöld on the situation in the Near and Middle East published.

Joint statement of Arab peace movement representatives, Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, and Soviet Committee for Solidarity with the Afro-Asian Countries published.

Soviet Ministry of Trade report published on a 9% reduction in the price of some types of fish.

Oblast committee plenary session held in Sverdlovsk.

Indonesian Minister of Shipping Mohammed Nazir arrives in Moscow.

2 Exchange of telegrams between Voroshilov and President Bourguiba on the first anniversary of the proclamation of the Republic of Tunesia published.

Soviet government note to the Israeli government on the use of Israeli air space for the transfer of troops to Lebanon and Jordan published.

Death reported of Soviet Deputy Minister of Electric Power Stations F. G. Loginov.

3 Khrushchev returns to Moscow from Peiping.

Soviet delegation arrives in Delhi for talks on Soviet-Indian economic cooperation.

4 Communiqué on Khrushchev's meeting with Mao Tse-tung in Peiping published.

Soviet Ambassador to Iraq G. T. Zaitsev arrives in Bagdad.

5 Khrushchev's talk with group of Indian journalists published.

Khrushchev has talk with Adlai Stevenson.

Party delegation returns to Moscow from Tokyo.

UN permanent Soviet representative A. A. Sobolev sends letter to Security Council Chairman Georges-Picot on the withdrawal of Anglo-American troops from Jordan and Lebanon.

6 Exchange of notes between Khrushchev and Eisenhower, Macmillan, and de Gaulle on the situation in the Near and Middle East published.

Italian Communist Party heads presently in the USSR received in the Party Central Committee.

Sobolev sends Hammarskjöld the texts of Khrushchev's replies to notes from Eisenhower, Macmillan, and de Gaulle.

7 Report published of ending of military maneuvers in the Transcaucasian and Turkestan military districts.

Chinese Party delegation leaves Moscow for Peiping.

Squadron of Soviet warships arrives in Finland on visit.

Members of Soviet parliamentary group delegation participating in the forty-seventh conference of the Interparliamentary Union return to Moscow from Brazil.

8 Graduation of specialists from the V. I. Lenin Military Political Academy held in Moscow.

Soviet scientists M. N. Pobedinsky and V. A. Petrov leave Moscow for the US to participate in a congress on the effect of radiation on human and animal organisms.

9 TASS statement on the arming of the Swiss army with atomic weapons published.

Report published of completion of the Kuibyshev Hydroelectric Power Station.

G. T. Zaitsev presents his credentials to chairman of the Iraqi Supreme State Council Rubai.

Soviet trade union delegation leaves Moscow for Chili.

Fifth assembly of the Special Committee for the International Geophysical Year ends in Moscow.

10 Soviet, Ukrainian, and Belorussian delegations arrive in New York for UN General Assembly emergency session.

Voroshilov arrives in Brussels on visit to the World Exhibition.

12 Exchange of notes between Khrushchev and Macmillan on a meeting of heads of government published.

International congress of astronomers begins in Moscow.

Squadron of Soviet warships leaves Finland for home.

Meeting of North Kazakhstan Oblast Party active held in Petropavlovsk.

Gromyko has talk with Dulles in New York.

Gromyko has talk with Hammarskjöld in New York.

Gromyko has talk with United Arab Republic Foreign Minister Fawzi in New York.

Gromyko has talk with UN permanent French representative Georges-Picot in New York.

13 Khrushchev receives French politician Mendès-France en route for home from China.

Khrushchev receives the Ceylonese Ambassador.

Khrushchev's reply to letter of the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Japanese Socialist Party on the situation in the Near and Middle East published.

Report published of departure of delegation of Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace to Tokyo to participate in the Fourth International Conference for the Prohibition of Atomic and Nuclear Weapons.

Gromyko has talk with Fawzi in New York.

14 The Chairman of the Indonesian Red Cross Society arrives in Moscow.

Gromyko has talk with Iraqi Foreign Minister Abdul Jabbar Jomard in New York.

15 Gromyko's speech at UN General Assembly emergency session on the situation in the Near and Middle East published.

Voroshilov returns to Moscow from Brussels.

16 Khrushchev's reply to letter of head of the Brentwood Section of the Movement for Nuclear Disarmament K. Wilder on the prohibition of atomic and nuclear weapons published.

Party Central Committee conference held on output of vegetables, potatoes, and fruit, for supply to the cities and industrial centers.

17 Khrushchev's greetings telegram to the Fourth International Conference for the Prohibition of Atomic and Nuclear Weapons in Tokyo published.

18 The chairman of the Pakistan National Assembly arrives in Moscow.

Agreement signed in Moscow on Soviet credit to Iceland to the value of 50 million krona in 1958.

Gromyko has talk with Dulles in New York.

20 International congress of astronomers ends in Moscow.

21 Gromyko's reply to letter of European workers' and trade unions' conference on the threat of an atomic war published.

23 Agreement signed in Moscow on Soviet technical aid to Poland in the building of an oil refinery.

24 Khrushchev's speech of August 13, 1958 at a meeting of the Smolensk Oblast Committee published.

Gromyko's statement at New York press conference on the situation in the Near and Middle East published.

Soviet foreign ministry statement on Iceland's decision to extend its fishing waters to a distance of 12 miles published.

25 Soviet, Ukrainian, and Belorussian delegations return to Moscow from UN General Assembly emergency session.

26 The Chairman of the Pakistan National Assembly leaves Moscow for home.

Khrushchev's reply to letter of British artists and critics on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests published.

27 Report published by the Economic Commission of the Council of Nationalities of the USSR on the long-range economic plan for 1959–65.

Conference on the development of Eastern Siberia ends in Irkutsk.

Soviet government note to the Italian government on the use of bases in Italy for the transfer of troops to Lebanon and Jordan published.

American financier and industrialist Cyrus Eaton arrives in Moscow.

Soviet missile with two dogs on board successfully launched to a height of 450 kilometers.

28 The Chairman of the All-Japanese Council for the Prohibition of Atomic and Nuclear Weapons arrives in Moscow.

29 Party Central Committee delegation arrives in Helsinki.

Supreme Soviet delegation returns to Moscow from visit to Uruguay.

30 Decree of the Party Central Committee and Council of Ministers "On the Further Development of the Soviet Gas Industry" published.

Khrushchev's reply to *Pravda* correspondent's questions on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests published.

Composition of the Soviet, Ukrainian, and Belorussian delegations to the Second International Conference for the Peaceful Use of Atomic Power, to be held September 1—13, 1958, in Geneva, published.

Squadron of Norwegian warships arrives in Murmansk on visit.

Squadron of Soviet warships arrives in Bergen on visit.

31 Soviet foreign ministry note to the US Embassy on the readiness of the Soviet government to begin talks on October 31, 1958 with the US and Great Britain on the conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of atomic and nuclear weapon tests and on supervision of the observation of such an agreement published.

Soviet embassy note to US State Department on the Soviet Union's refusal to send observers to a laboratory demonstration of atomic weapons published.

Changes and Appointments

16 N. A. Bulganin released from his duties as chairman of the Board of the State Bank of the USSR in connection with his appointment as chairman of the Stavropol Sovnarkhoz (economic region).

A. K. Korovushkin appointed chairman of the Board of the State Bank of the USSR.

22 V. S. Fedorov appointed chairman of the State Committee for Chemistry of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

23 S. S. Tikhomirov appointed first deputy chairman of the State Committee for Chemistry of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

24 D. A. Zhukov released from his duties as Ambassador to Indonesia in connection with his appointment to another post.

B. M. Volkov appointed Ambassador to Indonesia.

27 I. G. Kabanov released from his position as Minister of Foreign Trade in connection with his appointment to another post.

N. S. Patolichev released from his position as First Deputy Foreign Minister in connection with his appointment as Minister of Foreign Trade.